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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Under present international trade law, a can of tuna is a can of tuna — regardless of
whether thousands of dolphins were killed in the process of catching that tuna."'
Tuna and dolphins have come to symbolize the policy struggle between trade and the
environment.- Both are primary values in an ecologically and economically interdependent
world.^ Unleashing trade without fetters is as detrimental as guarding the environment at the
expense of trade and development. It is necessary to reconcile any differences between the
two. Sustainable development is the theme for the future.''
' William J. Snape III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searchingfor GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are
"Process Standards" Getting "Due Process'^'" 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 777, 786 (1994). Such an "alarmist"
view may not be totally founded. See e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection
of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. iNT'L L. 700, 726 (1992). "Contrary to the alarmist
claims of some environmentalists, there is no inherent conflict between international trade as it has evolved
under the aegis of the GATT and protection of environmental quality. The GATT recognizes and contains
policy instruments that can be used to protect domestic and global natural resources; the GATT and
environmental protection are largely compatible." Id. See also DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE,
Environment, and the Future 53 ( 1 994)[hereinafter Esty]. "The GATT is not as misguided as some
environmentalists would have the public believe." Id.
' See Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 1, at 778. ESTY, supra note 1, at 29. Though NAFTA drew
attention to the trade and environment conflict, it was the tuna-dolphin dispute that "turned interest into fliry."
Id
^ See Esty, supra note 1 , at 1 7-23.
" The Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development is believed
to have coined the term "sustainable development" which defined it as
"(a) development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. It contains within two concepts:
(b) the concept of "needs", in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding
priority should be given; and
(c) the ideal of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organizations on the
environment's ability to meet present and future needs." Phillippe Sands, International Law in the
Field ofSustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
International Law 58 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995)[hereinafter "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT"].
1
2Until a few decades ago, policy makers of both trade and environment concentrated
their efforts within their respective areas. '^ Trade became institutionalized under the
"umbrella" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT");^ and now under the
World Trade Organization (WTO)'' and has consistently developed. In contrast, the
environment has had a weak growth in part due to lack of comprehensive institutional entity
such as the GATT.^ Its growth is sporadic and sparse. Indeed, the relationship between the
The term "Sustainable Development" has been incorporated in numerous international treaties; for
e.g., the Preamble to the WTO states: "Recognizing that their [members'] relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to the raising of standards of living, ensuring full
employment, and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding
the production and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the worlds' resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the means of doing so." Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
April 14, 1 994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
Economic Relations 3 (3d. ed., 1995)[hereinafter Supplement]. The above principle was affirmed in
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Adopted June 14, 1992, at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.l.,
repnntedmZX I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992).
^ ESTY, supra note 1, at 9.
* General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
1 88, reprinted in GATT, BISD 4S/1 ( 1 969). On the origins ofGATT, see generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
Trade And The LawOfGatt(1969).
' As a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the GATT became the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1145(1994).
' The GATT 1947 was amended and modified through the Uruguay Round Negotiations. Now the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, incorporates the GATT 1994. In addition,
"fifteen Agreements are annexed to GATT 1994, the most important being the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Agriculture, and the Agreement on Services." Thomas
J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 271, n. 22 (1997).
' See ESTY, supra note 1 , at 77. The environment was given a strong impetus by the United Nations
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in 1972, when the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) was established. Also, the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janiero established "a new phase in international environmental law in which environmental and
economic issues" were joined. International Environmental Law Anthology 5 (Anthony D' Amato
etal. eds., 1996)[hereinafter ANTHOLOGY].
3environment and trade was rarely seen. Generally, it was seen only as many times are there
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) which contain trade restrictions.'" The
lighting rod that changed all this came with what is now a notoriously familiar Tuna-dolphin
dispute." In early 1990, the United States, based on its domestic law, had banned the import
of tuna and tuna products from Mexico and other countries that were fishing in a manner that
caused damage to the dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. Mexico challenged the
ban before the GATT. A GATT Panel ruled against the United States and held that the tuna
ban is inconsistent with the GATT.'-^ The GATT became the subject of attack from rather
an "unexpected front" '^ ~ the environmental community. The ruling enraged the
environmental community and sent them into a fury, confirming its worst fears. '"^ Indeed,
'° Out of the nearly 150 or so multilateral environmental agreements, only around 19 or so have been
identified to have trade restrictions. Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 717 n. 94. ESTY, supra note 1, at 275
(listing the Multilateral Environmental Agreements with trade provisions). The most popular ones are: The
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987)[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989)[hereinafter Basel
Convention].
" The United States' tuna ban was challenged twice before the GATT. The first challenge was in
1991. See United States -- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598 (1992)[hereinafter First Tuna
Panel]. This decision was not adopted by the GATT Council or the Contracting Parties. The second challenge
was in 1994. See United States ~ Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)[hereinafter Second
Tuna Panel].
'^ See chapter II, infra.
'^ Schoenbaum, supra note I, at 700.
'"• For a general description of the criticisms of environmentalists against, in particular the First tuna
Panel decision, see ESTY, supra note 1, at 35-59; see also Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 700-704.
4the environmentalists had a "catalogue of grievances" against free trade. '^ At a general level,
the "policy discord" between the two has been excellently captured in the following passage:
Some environmentalists see protection of the environment as an absolute
imperative. Once it is destroyed, it cannot be replaced. The future of the planet is at
stake. Free trade is only a relative value, a means to an end, and thus free traders are
only pragmatists with no absolute ideals. The protection of the environment, on the
other hand, is an absolute ideal, perhaps the ultimate ideal since without it we will
be unable to live.
Some trade specialists see free trade (or the best approximation of free trade
that can be achieved in the real world) as the only way to maintain a healthy global
economy and support economic development. Protectionism led to the Great
Depression of the 1930s and World War II. There is no political security without
economic security and no economic security without a free and competitive world
market. Environmentalists may have good intentions, but they are naive and do not
understand the real needs of most of the world today. '^
A. Basic GATT Rules
As the centerpiece of the trade system, the GATT is a "curious institution" bom with
birth defects;''' and, has yet survived the passage of time. It is a multilateral framework of
rules designed to promote free and fair trade. '^ by eliminating all forms of barriers to trade
and, by imposing a set of obligations. Now under the WTO, the "GATT 1994 not only
'- See generally A Catalogue of Grievances. THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993. Environmentalists
claimed that GATT : (1) promotes free trade which leads to economic growth, but damages the environment;
(2) prevents use of higher environmental standards; (3) does not allow PPMs; (4) does not allow "eco"
subsidies; (5) encourages a "race to the bottom" ; (6) prevents bans of DPGs; (7) does not allow the use of
extraterritorial use of environmental standards; (8) does not automatically validate international environmental
agreements; (9) does not allow participation of environmentalists in dispute resolution. Id See also Charles
Haag, Legitimizing "Environmental" Legislation under the GATT in Light ofthe CAFE Panel Report: More
Fuelfor Protectionists'^ 57 U. PiTT. L. REV. 79 ( 1 995).
'* Robert A. Reinstein, Trade and Environment: The Case for and Against Unilateral Actions, in
Sustainable Development, ^wpra note 4, at 231. These statements of course reflect the diametrical
positions of the trade and environment schools.
" JOHN H. Jackson, Restructuring The Gatt System 1 (1990).
'* For an excellent analysis of the GATT, see JACKSON, supra note 6.
5establishes the normative structure for trade" but it also "seeks to further the goal of free
international trade." '^
A GATT member has three primary obligations. First, the most-favored nation or
"foreign parity" principle is found in Article l.'° The "foreign parity" requires that each
member State accord "unconditional" treatment to like products originating from, or
destined to, other members.
Second, GATT imposes the "national treatment obligation" or "inland parity" by
prohibiting discrimination between domestically produced goods and imported goods
broadly in all respects.-' This prohibits a member state from imposing regulations or taxes
in a way "so as to afford protection to domestic protection"-- or subject the imported
products either "directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind
in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products."-^ Again in
Article I, paragraph 4, it states that imported products "shall be accorded no less favorable
treatment than that accorded to like products of national origin" in all respects. -*
Third, GATT prohibits the use of quotas or other quantitative restrictions on the
export or import of goods.-" However, some exceptions are provided in paragraph 1 namely
(a) export restrictions on foodstuffs or other products to relieve critical shortages "essential"
to the contracting party;^^ (b) import or export prohibitions necessary to the application of
" Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 27 1
.
^° Art. I, GATT BISD. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 249-272.
^' See Jackson, supra note 6, at 273-303.
'^ Art. I, para. 1,GATT.
^^ Art. I, para. 3, GATT.
^' Art. I, para. 4, GATT.
" Art. XI, GATT.
^' Art. XI(2)(a), GATT.
standards or regulations for the classification of commodities;-' and (c) "import restrictions
on any agricultural or fisheries product that are necessary to the enforcement of certain
governmental measures.""* Broadly, the above "three pillars" constitute the framework with
which the international trade policies are governed.
B. Environmental Exceptions Under the GATT:How "Green" Are They?
The environmental exceptions that are relevant for our discussion are found in Article
XX of the GATT. It provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of such
measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption. ..r^
In its interpretation of the above provision, and in particular. Article XX(b) and (g),
the tuna-dolphin controversy has raised several policy questions which need to be answered.
At the broadest level, the issue centers around the use of trade measures for environmental
purposes. The problem arises because in the garb of environmental concerns, protectionist
barriers are raised. ^° How to separate the "wheat from the chaff — the genuine ones from
" Art. XI 2(b), GATT.
2* Art. XI 2(c), GATT.
-' Art. XX, GATT.
^° See Haag, supra note 1 5, at 80.
the disguised trade restrictions ~ is a troubling issue. The further question is whether
countries could unilaterally determine environmental standards. The use of unilateral
measures causes considerable controversy.^' Likewise, should countries be allowed to
protect the environment beyond their own borders, or the shared environment, or be limited
to its jurisdiction?^- It is known that products may be produced by either "clean" or "dirty"
production modes. Is it proper for the countries to refuse to allow products that have been
produced by "dirty" production technologies, the "dirtiness", or rather the cleanliness, being
determined by the regulating country's standard."
C. A Search For Solutions
In attempts to answer these questions and reconcile the differences raised by the tuna-
dolphin dispute, a large body of literature has emerged.^'' Even though the tuna-dolphin
controversy itself has ended, the debate continues. If it was the tuna ban for the protection
of dolphins one time, it is the shrimp ban for sea-turtles now; it could be salmon and sharks
^' See Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country Concerns,
in International Trade and the Environment 337, 337 (Patrick Low ed., 1992); See also Steve
Chamovitz, Recent Developments: Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly
Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 1 , 757 ( 1 994).
^^ See generally Reinstein, supra note 16, at 223. See also Laura Campbell's Comment on Reinstein's
views. Id. at 233.
" See generally Candice Stevens, Trade and the Environment: The PPMs Debate in SUSTAINABLE
Development, supra note 4, at 239. See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum's Comment on the views expressed by
Candice Stevens. Id. at 249.
'" Numerous contributions in books and scholarly journals have been published on the subject. A
leading book that gives a comprehensive analysis is ESTY, supra note 1; see also SUSTAINABLE
Development
,
supra note 4 ; Trade And the Environment: Law, Economics, And Policy (D. Zaelke
et al eds., 1993)[hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. The leading commentator on the environmental
side, Steve Chamovitz and on the trade side, Jagdish Bhagwati have contributed numerous articles on the
subject. See Steve Chamovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL
iNT'L L. J. 459 (1994)[hereinafter Defogging the debate\,C):\?imo\\X.z, supra note 31; Steve Chamovitz, A
Taxonomy ofEnvironmental Trade Measures, 6 GEO. iNT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1993)[hereinafter,'^ Taxonomy];
Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and Environment: The False Conflict? in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra at
159 (1993). The above list is not exhaustive.
8yet another time.^^ A "continuing search for reconcihation" is made.^^ Some commentators
believe that GATT is not suited to address environmental concems;^^ they advocate the
formation of a new institution such as the Global Environmental Organization (GEO); or a
World Environmental Organization (WEO);^* or General Agreement on the Environment
(GATE).^'' Some others believe that reconciliation is possible within the GATT framework;
they suggest "institutional cures" like an amendment,''^ or a waiver incorporating
environmental concerns."*' Without doubt, these approaches deserve merit and need to be
pursued. Regrettably, they are not practicable. Negotiations between parties of a multilateral
agreement is a tedious and cumbersome process. And amendment or waiver of the GATT
requires the political will of atleast two-thirds of its members. This is not feasible.'*- The
" See Environment: Under Attack: It's Humans, Not Sharks, Who Are Nature's Most Fearsome
Predators, TIME p. 59 (Aug. 11, 1997).
^* See Schoenbaum, supra note 8.
^
'' Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA TT, The ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes 1
5
Mich. J. Int'L. L. 1043, 1071 (1994). Dunhoff argues that the GATT "has no mandate to advance
environmental interests. Where conflict exists, GATT practice invariably subordinates environmental interests
to trade interests." Id.
^* ESTY, supra note 1 , at 230-3 1
.
^' Edith B. Weiss, Environmental Equity: The Imperative for the Twenty-First Century, in
Sustainable Development, supra note 4, at 26.
''° Indeed the GATT Panels have indicated their preference for an amendment process. See e.g.. First
Tuna Panel, supra note 1 1, para. 6.3. "If the Contracting Parties were to decide to permit trade measures of
this type (such as the US tuna embargo) in particular circumstances, it would therefore be preferable for them
to do so not by interpreting article XX, but by amending or supplementing" the GATT. Id. Likewise, other
commentators have suggested an amendment approach. See Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT:
Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397,402
(1994)(argues that there is an urgent need of amendment or supplementation ofGATT to allow environmental
concerns without violating GATT).
"" Douglas Jake Caldwell, International Environmental Agreements and the GA TT: An Analysis ofthe
Potential Conflict and the Role ofa GATT "Waiver" Resolution, 18 Md. J. Int'L&TRADE 173, 187-197(1994).
"In the current international climate, the GATT waiver represents the most practical method of securing
immediately the legitimate environmental protection goals of the international environmental agreements." Id.
''^ See Dunhoff, supra note 37, at 1066-71. Dunhoff examines each of the "institutional cures":
amending the GATT, utilizing the GATT waiver provision and negotiating a separate "environmental code"
9non-feasibility of such approaches is illustrated by the failure to include the term
"environment" in Article XX/^ It is troubling to notice that from the date of formation of
the GATT till today, there is no "general agreement on the environment.""*'*
Recognizing that harmonization is an important means to reconcile trade and
environment issues, the WTO member States created the Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE)/^ The "positive" harmonization efforts are wdfcome. The
Committee's agenda is promising/^ Regrettably, its action is slow."*^ If the march of law at
and concludes that "none of the . . . proposed cures are satisfactory." Id.
*^ See id. at 1067. "[I]n 1991, the Negotiating Group on GATT Articles rejected a suggestion that
would have added the phrase "the environment" to Article XX(b)." Id.
^ Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 270.
^^ In the Marrakesh Conference meeting on April 14, 1994, the GATT Contracting Parties adopted
a Ministerial Decision formally establishing the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). Trade and
Environment, GATT Ministerial Decision of 14 Apr. 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994).
^^ See generally Jennifer Schultz, The GA TT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment—Toward
Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 438(1995). "[C]reation of the Committee on Trade and the
Environment under the WTO was a welcome relief to environmentalists". Id.
'•^ The terms of reference of Committee on Trade and Envirormient (CTE) reads in part:
(a) to identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, in order to
promote sustainable development;
(b) to make appropriate recommendation on whether any modifications of the provisions of the
multilateral trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable and nondiscriminatory
nature of the system, as in regards, in particular:
-the need for rules to enhance positive interaction between trade and environmental measures, for the
promotion of sustainable development, with special consideration to the needs of developing
countries, in particular those of the least developed among them; and
-the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and the adherence to effective muhilateral disciplines
to ensure the responsiveness of the multilateral trading system to environmental objectives set forth
in Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, in particular Principle 12; and
-the surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-related aspects of
environmental measures which have significant trade effects, and of effective implementation of the
multilateral disciplines governing those measures.
Taken from Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. Probs. 175, 180, n.lO (1996).
"* Since its inception, the CTE has had four meetings: February 16, 1995; April 6, 1995; June 21,
1995. The Singapore Conference was on December 13, 1996. See Kelly Jude Hunt, International
Environmental Agreements in Conflict with GATT—Greening GATT after the Uruguay Round Agreement, 30
iNT'L Law 163, 180-81 (1996). Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 269. Referring to the Singapore Conference,
Schoenbaum points out that it "does little to inspire confidence that the CTE will be able to formulate concrete
10
the legislative level does not proceed at the expected pace, "negative harmonization" can fill
some gaps. A "realistic" approach would be to use a "panel-created" doctrine that balances
the interests of trade and environment.'*'
This thesis argues that the "panel-created" doctrine should be a rule of reason
approach.'*^ The success of such an approach is very evident from the experience of the
European Court of Justice and the United States Supreme Court.^' In both jurisdictions, the
level of protection to the environment desired were not explicitly maintained. Both have
developed legal bases to overcome the perceived 'inadequacies' of the law and have made
attempts to reconcile the two policy commitments; in particular, the European Court of
Justice has been creative in the 'negative harmonization' process."
In chapter II, an analysis of the tuna-dolphin decisions is made. It will be shown
that the tuna-ban panels have interpreted the Article XX exceptions narrowly. This has
created an imbalance between trade and the environment rendering the reconciliation of the
two goals rather difficult. However, in a related development, the United States appealed
the WTO Panel Report on the Reformulated Gasoline^^ case decision. In its decision on
May 20, 1996, the Appellate Body rejected some conclusions of the Panel Report of the
Reformulated Gasoline case with respect to Article XX(g) and Article XX of the GATT as
Schoenbaum points out that it "does little to inspire confidence that the CTE will be able to formulate concrete
recommendations for reconciling the important issues at stake." Id.
"' Philip M. Nichols, Trade without values, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 658, 714-719 (1996).
^' See chapter III, infra.
" Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EC Law: Text, Cases, And Materials, 586 (1995).
"Harmonization is essentially negative and deregulatory in the sense that the result is that national rules are
held not to apply. This can be contrasted with 'positive harmonization' which results from the promulgation
of . .
.
legislative measures, stipulating which rules can apply across the . . .[country] as a whole." Id.
" Report of the Panel in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like Products of National Origin) 35 LL.M. 274 (1996)[hereinafter the
Reformulated Gasoline case].
11
a whole. ^"^ To be sure, the Appellate Body decision is a turning point in the GATT
jurisprudence. A change in the landscape has occurred and the decision could be expected
to close the gap that exists between trade and the environment. Chapter II also addresses how
this decision impacts the resolution of the trade and environment conflicts.
In chapter III. the jurisprudence of the United States and the European Union is
examined. It is shown that they have created a rule of reason approach to balance the
contending goals of trade and the environment. However, the study reveals that the language
of the European Union Treaty provisions and the GATT are similar. Further, the issues that
the European Court confronted while interpreting the key provisions are identical to the
issues faced by the GATT. Consequently, the approach of the European Court is examined
closely. This examination shows how the rule of reason approach has helped the European
Court to bring a balance between free flow of commerce and protection of the environment.
As mentioned above, this thesis proposes that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
adopt the rule of reason approach to resolve trade and environment issues. Interestingly, an
excellent opportunity to put to test the rule of reason doctrine exists already. Recently,
effective May 1 , 1 996, the United States has slapped a ban on the import of shrimp from
India and other Asian countries on the ground that shrimp is being harvested in a manner
detrimental to marine sea-turtles.^^ Predictably, the affected countries have complained
before the World Trade Organization (WTO).^^ To date, the dispute is undecided.
^ See Report of the Appellate Body in United States -Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996)[hereinafter the Gasoline Standards case].
" On May 1, 1996, the United States banned shrimp imports from countries which harvested shrimp
without the Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) and caused danger to the sea-turtles. Earlier, the United States
had imposed shrimp imports on a "shipment-by-shipment" basis. However, on a lawsuit filed by the Earth
Island Institute, (Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 13 ITR 73, l/17/96),the Court of International Trade
ruled that the US ban on shrimp imports should apply worldwide. BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY , Jun. 25, 1997.
The major shrimp exporters are Thailand, India, China, Bangladesh, and Honduras. BNA iNT'L TRADE REP.,
May 8, 1996.
'* On February 25, 1997, a WTO Panel was established to examine the complaint filed by India, and
several other Asia countries. The Panel is yet to decide the dispute. See Overview of the State-of-play ofWTO
12
Chapter IV addresses the issues raised by the above US shrimp embargo. An attempt
is made to see how the WTO Panel would examine the embargo under the current GATT
analysis. In this regard, the impact of the Appellate Body's decision in the US Standards
case is also taken into consideration. Further, the embargo is analyzed under the suggested
rule ofreason analysis. By this case study, an effort is made to highlight the similarities and
differences in analyses between the current GATT analysis and the suggested rule of reason
analysis. Finally, chapter V concludes the thesis.
Disputes, <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin.html> (visited 07/08/97). The Overview is upto date as on June
25, 1997.
CHAPTER II
THE TUNA-DOLPHIN CASE AND THE GATTAVTO JURISPRUDENCE
A. Background
In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). a "unique ecological relationship"
between tuna and dolphins has been long observed.' The commercial fishing industry
exploited this "relationship" by locating dolphins and encircling them with purse-seine nets
to catch the tuna underneath,- resulting in high accidental death or "taking" of dolphins.
Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act^ (MMPA) which prohibits such "incidental
taking/"* the United States imposed a ban on Mexican tuna and tuna products harvested using
the purse-seine nets. The MMPA sought to implement its policy through two limbs. First,
the United States controlled and reduced the "incidental" killing of dolphins by its domestic
fishing industry.^ Second, the MMPA had stipulated that in order to access the U.S. markets
' United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the GATT Panel (August 16, 1991), 30
I.L.M. 1594, 1598 [hereinafter First Tuna Panel].
^Id.dX 1598, para 2.2.
' The Marine Mammal Protection Act, (hereinafter MMPA) P.L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as
amended, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990).
" Taking includes "harassment, hunting, capture, killing or attempt thereof." See id.
^ See Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA, which limited the "incidental" killing of dolphins to 20,500
dolphins per year, out of which only 250 may belong to the coastal dolphin species("Stenella Attenuata") and
2750 may be Eastern Spinner dolphin species {Stenella Longirostris"). In this regard, Mexico argued that
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for the tuna and tuna products, foreign tuna producers fishing in the ETP region must have
dolphin-safe standards comparable to that of the United States.^ In addition to the embargo
against Mexico, the import ban was applied as against other "intermediary" countries that
imported tuna from the "primar>'" embargoed countries. This tuna import ban became the
subject of challenge before the GATT in 1991 and 1994.^
B. The Tuna-ban Panel Reports
In late 1991, Mexico challenged the United States' ban before the GATT. Mexico
argued that the import ban was a quantitative restriction contrary to Article XI of the GATT.*
It argued that by banning tuna from a specific geographic area, namely the ETP, the United
States violated Article XIII which condemns discrimination based on a specific geographic
area.^ Furthermore, Mexico alleged that United States also violated the national treatment
obligation. '° Claiming that domestic tuna and imported tuna are 'like' products, Mexico
the species of dolphins explicitly mentioned by the MMPA were neither considered threatened or extinct
under the CITES. First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1599, para. 2.4.
'' See MMPA, supra note 3. Section 101(a)(2)(B) of the MMPA provides that "importation of
yellowfm is prohibited unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that (i) the government of the harvesting
countr>' has a program regulating taking of marine mammals by vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable
to the average rate of such taking by United States vessels. " Id. To meet the comparable standard, countries
were required to show that their dolphin-take was "not in excess of 1 .25 times the average incidental taking
rate of the United States vessels operating in the ETP during the same period." Id.
' In March, 1992, the European Economic Community (now European Union) joined by the Kingdom
of Netherlands challenged the "intermediary embargo" as violative of GATT obligations. Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (June 1994)[hereinafter Second
tuna panel]
.
* First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1616, para. 5.8.
'M at 1602, para. 3.14.
'"/c?. at 1603, para. 3.16.
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argued that the United States measures under the MMPA, whose stated legislative purpose
was to protect dolphins, does not affect tuna as a product; consequently, the Mexican tuna-
ban was a violation of the GATT obligation to accord Mexican tuna "no less favorable
treatment" than the US tuna." In the United States' view, the tuna ban was not a quantitative
restriction, but were laws and regulations covered under Article III of the GATT, since the
MMPA measures were enforced at the time or point of importation. Further, the United
States argued that the "no less favorable treatment" argument is not valid by underscoring
the fact that foreign tuna producers had an additional margin of 25 percent over that of the
United States producers.'- On the contrary, foreign tuna producers were treated more
favorably than their domestic counterparts under the MMPA measures.'^ However, the Panel
found that since Article III applies to products, the MMPA measures which does not cover
the product tuna as such, but the process by which it is harvested, would not fall under
Article III. The Panel concluded that the direct import prohibition of tuna and tuna products
violated the Article XI obligations of the United States.'''
Though the GATT Panels touched many aspects of the GATT provisions, for the purpose
of this analysis, their findings with regard to the environmental exceptions under Article XX
are important. To determine the GATT-consistency of a measure at issue under Article XX,
the GATT Panels typically subject the challenged measure to a three step analysis. First,
'-Id. at 1602-3, paras.3.18- 3.20.
''Id. at 1603, para. 3.20.
'"/J. at 1618, para. 5.18.
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the Panel makes a conservation policy analysis. In particular, the conservation of an
environmental target outside the regulating state is not excepted. Second, the Panel
examines if the measures satisfy the requirements under Article XX (b) and (g)
requirements; and third, it looks to see if the measure satisfies the preambular conditions of
Article XX.
1. What are "necessary" Measures
It is established that Article XX(b) can justify a measure that seeks to protect the
human, animal or plant life or health within the borders of the regulating State.''' Whether
measures that seek to protect targets beyond the regulating States' territories would fall
within the meaning of "necessary" was one of the basic questions raised by the tuna-dolphin
dispute. The GATT Panel noted that the text of Article XX(b) does not explicitly answer the
question whether a contracting party could take measures "necessary" to protect the
environment outside its jurisdiction.'^ Consequently, the Panel resorted to a historical
analysis, a purpose analysis and an analysis of the interpretive consequences urged by the
parties on the GATT as a whole.
In its historical analysis, the Panel noticed that Article XX(b) in its present form read
similar to Article 32(b) of the Draft Charter of the International Trade Organization(ITO).
In the process of its revision, a proviso was added by the New York Draft to the ITO charter,
which read: "For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if
'^ See e.g., Panel Report on Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, adopted 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/200[hereinafter Thai Cigarettes case](where Thailand
justified its regulation under the Article XX exceptions. The GATT Panel rejected the claims of Thailand on
other grounds).
'^ First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1619, para. 5.24.
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corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing
country."'^ If the measures were intended to be applied domestically, requiring parties to
impose domestic restrictions would seem superfluous. Accordingly, the added proviso was
dropped by the drafters as "unnecessary."'^ From this the Panel inferred that Article XX(b)
exception was to be applied within one's jurisdiction.'^ Further, in its 'purpose' analysis, the
Panel noted that all challenged measures are subject to the conditions against misuse. It
pointed out that the purpose of the exceptions was to allow contracting parties to pursue their
overriding public policy goaIs."° Similar to Article XX(b), Article XX(d) uses the term
"/J. at para. 5.26.
''Id
^'^Id at 1620, para 5.26. The Panel noticed that before Article XX(b) came to be read in its present
form, the exception read: "For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if corresponding
domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing country." Id. at 1619, para. 5.26. This
proposal was introduced in the New York Draft to the ITO Charter. Id. Earlier, the United States in the Draft
Charter of the ITO read: "Nothing in Chapter IV [on commercial policy] of this Charter shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures; . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health." Id. For a criticism of the Panel's analysis and conclusion that trade measures are
restricted to domestic application, see Belinda Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental
Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751 (1993). Anderson relies on the Article 4 of the Convention on
Suppression of Import and Export Prohibitions, which is similar in wording to Art. XX of the GATT. During
its debate, the United States had referred to the jurisdictional scope of some of its laws in existence at that point
in time. She points out that nevertheless, the Convention participants did not narrow the exception. Thus, a
"reasonable conclusion" could be drawn that the participants shared the view of the United States;
consequently, extra-territorial conservation efforts should be legitimately excepted. /li. at 758-60. But see John
H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Interdependent Goals or Irreconcilable Conflict?
49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1221, 1241 (1992)(preparatory documents of treaties constitute a secondary means
of treaty interpretation; thus its reliance is circumscribed). Moreover, Anderson relies on a historical "omission"
to reach her conclusion. Anderson, supra, 758-60. Indeed, this was done by the tuna-ban Panel in its analysis.
See First Tuna Panel, supra note 1
.
^° First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1692, para. 5.27. See also Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15.
Thailand had restricted imports of cigarettes and subject it to internal taxes. With regard to Article XX (g),
even though the Panel accepted that "smoking constituted a serious risk to human health and that consequently
measures to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fell within the scope of article XX(g)," id. at 222-23, para.
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"necessary." Previous GATT Panels had ruled under the Article XX(d) context that a
measure becomes "necessary," if alternative and inconsistent measures that could be
reasonably employed were not available."' Indeed, if such a measure is "not reasonably
available" then, a country should employ the least GATT inconsistent alternative. -^
However, since trade-restrictive measures risk inconsistency with GATT obligations, such
inconsistent measure are allowed only to the extent they are unavoidable.-^ Then the Panel
made a "consequences" test of Article XX(b). While Mexico urged a narrow interpretation,
the United States pressed for a broad interpretation. The consequences of the United States'
approach, the Panel viewed, would lead to unilateralism where each contracting party could
"unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from which other contracting
parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights"-"* under the GATT. Further, the
Panel reiterated that since the United States measures could not, by themselves, achieve their
intended effect, but depended on the changes in policies of other countries, they are not
"necessary" measures. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that Article XX(b) applied outside
the jurisdiction of the United States, the Panel pointed out that the "necessary" conditions
would not be satisfied unless the United States had "exhausted all options reasonably
72, the Panel held that other less restrictive measures were available and consequently, it did not satisfy the
"necessary" criterion under Article XX(b), Id
-' Second Tuna Pane!, supra note 7, at 896.
~ Id. at 896, para. 5.34, citing Report of the Panel on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, adopted 7 November 1989, L/6439, 365/345, 392. para. 5.26 [hereinafter 5ecr/o« 357 case]. See also
Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15.
^^ Second Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 896.
^^ First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1620, para. 5.27.
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available to it."-' Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the United States' measures were
inconsistent under Article XX(b) of the GATT.
2. Article XX(g)
Unlike Article XX(b) which clearly specifies the targets for conservation namely
human, animal or plant life or health. Article XX(g) covers "exhaustible natural resources."
This is the starting point for any Article XX(g) analysis. This has two purposes. First,
whether the target chosen by the regulating party is worthy of conservation efforts is
questioned. Once this is fixed, the second purpose is to ensure that the conservation efforts
do not deviate from the target. Thus if some product A is the target of conservation, the
regulating party may not use measures regulating product B for its conservation strategy. It
must necessarily focus on the product that is sought to be conserved.
Generally, the GATT Panels have agreed on the targets of conservation chosen by the
regulating countries.-^ However, the GATT Panels have insisted that a contracting party
cannot seek to protect resources that are beyond their borders.-^ In the tuna-ban case, the
United States insisted that Article XX(g) has application outside domestic borders. The tuna-
ban Panels gave a negative answer. In their analysis, the Panels immediately conceded that
dolphins are "exhaustible natural resources."-^ Unlike Article XX(b) which uses the term
-Ud.
'* See e.g., Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15; First Tuna Panel, supra note 1 ; Second Tuna Panel,
supra note 7; Reformulated Gasoline case, infra.
^^ See e.g., Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 1 5.
^^ Second Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 890, para. 5.11.
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"necessary," Article XX(g) poses interpretative problems of the terms "relating to" and "in
conjunction with domestic production or consumption."
3. Meaning of the Terms 'relating to' and 'in conjunction with'
Previous Panels had concluded that "relating to" and "in conjunction with" should
be taken to mean "primarily aimed" at the conservation of the resource and its restrictions
on consumption or production within the invoking country.'^ Further, the tuna-ban Panel
also noted that previous Panels have devised the "purpose" and "effects" test to determine
the "primarily aimed at" requirement.^^ In other words, not only should a measure have the
"purpose" of conserving an exhaustible natural resource, but also capable of producing the
desired effect of conservation. Admittedly, the purpose of the United States measure was
dolphin protection. However, its measures banned any tuna, regardless of whether they
were caught using "dolphin-safe" fishing techniques or not. Moreover, a measure whose
effectiveness depended on whether the exporting country changed its policies or practices
is ineffective. Such ineffective measures could not possibly further the "purpose" of the
conservation. Accordingly, the GATT Panel concluded that the United States measures does
not satisfy the "relating to" test.^' Thus if dolphins are the conservation target, a measure
'^
Id. at 892, para. 5.21. See United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada, Feb. 22, 1982, Gatt B.I.S.D. (29th Supp., 1982); Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, Gait B.I.S.D. (35th Supp. 1988)[hereinafter Unprocessed
herring case]; In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for the Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,
Panel No. CDA-89- 1807-01 (OCT. 16, 1989), available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, USCFTA file ; see also Janet
McDonald, Greening the GA TT:Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World
Order, 23 Envtl. L. 397, 445-46 (1993).
'° Second Tuna Panel, supra note 7, at 892.
^' Id at 893.
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regulating tuna is not acceptable. Put another way, banning import of tuna and tuna
products is not "primarily aimed at" conservation of dolphins. Allowing trade restrictions
on any product non-related to the target of conservation could lead to unilateralism and lead
to protectionism of one's domestic industries.
4. The Jurisdiction of the Target
Without doubt, dolphins are conservable. However, the location of the dolphins
becomes an arguable issue. Can a regulating State protect dolphins that exist anywhere in
the world or is it restricted to protecting the species within its own jurisdiction? The EEC
(now European Union) and the Netherlands claimed that on an "object and purpose"
interpretation of Article XX(g), the natural resource could not be located outside the
jurisdiction of the regulating country. The United States urged a literal reading of Article
XX(g), arguing that it places no limitation on the jurisdiction or location of the "exhaustible
natural resource" to be conserved.^- Indeed, the Panel agreed with the United States'
interpretation that Article XX(g) does not indicate as to the location of the natural resource.
The Panel observed that other than placing explicit preambular limitations on the use of
Article XX(g), its text does not specify the "nature and precise scope" of the exception. The
Panel reasoned that on an examination of other paragraphs under Article XX, in particular
Article XX(e) relating to prison labor, it could not be said that "extra-territorial" measures
are "proscribed in an absolute manner."" The "preparatory works", on which the first tuna-
ban Panel had relied in part to conclude that Article XX(g) applied to resources within one's
"M at 891, para. 5.14.
''Id.
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jurisdiction had far less appeal to the second tuna-ban Panel. Thus, it concluded that it
"could see no valid reason to support the conclusion" that Article XX(g) applies only to
policies related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources located within the
territory of regulating party. ^"^
It may also be pointed out that in its historical analysis of Article XX(b), the tuna-
ban Panels noted that the term "domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the
importing country" in Article 32(b) of the Draft ITO Charter was omitted by it drafters as
"unnecessary." In its final form. Article XX(b) concerns conservation efforts. Put in
context, "domestic safeguards" means some sort of restrictions on its domestic production
or consumption which is similar to the language used in Article XX(g) which says "made
effective in conjunction with domestic production or consumption." If from the fact that the
term was deliberately omitted as "unnecessary", the Panel inferred non-extra-jurisdictional
application of Article XX(b), conversely, the "non-omission" of the above phrase in Article
XX(g) could be viewed as a provision that Article XX(g) was intended to apply extra-
jurisdictionally.
Nevertheless, the tuna-ban Panels have rested their jurisdictional issue on the
effectiveness of the measure: the presumption being that a measure is most effective when
the target of conservation is within the regulating state's borders. It observed:
A country can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible
natural resource only to the extent that the production or consumption is under its
jurisdiction. This suggests Article XX(g) was intended to permit contracting parties to
'"Mat 892, para. 5.20.
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take trade measures primarily rendering effective restrictions on production or
consumption within their jurisdiction/^
Recalling an earlier panel's finding, which observed that
The purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen
the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the
commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies
aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources^^
the tuna-ban Panel emphasized that an interpretation that would allow measures taken to
force other countries to change their policies would affect the "balance of rights," in
particular, the right of "access to markets" and would seriously impair the GATT
framework.
Since both the Panels found that the United States measures did not satisfy the
"essential conditions" under Article XX(b) and (g), it was unnecessary for them to examine
the preambular restrictions. Nevertheless, the United States claimed that since the preamble
to Article XX mentions that "nothing in this [GATT] Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures," Article XX
constitutes a separate justification in itself.^^ The Panel however, following an earlier GATT
PaneP^ concluded that "Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from obligations
" First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1621.
^^ Unprocessed herring case, supra note 29, at 114, para. 4.6.
" First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1605.
^* Section 337 case, supra note 22, at 385, para. 5.9.
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under other provisions of the General Agreement, and not a positive rule establishing
obligations in itself.""^
C. The CAFE Dispute
In 1994. a GATT Panel"*^ examined another United States' regulation called the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard (CAFE)'*' and the Gas Guzzler Tax''.- The
CAFE standard had a "general fleet averaging" and "separate foreign fleet averaging"
scheme. The Gas Guzzler tax was applied on the sales of individual cars that did not meet
the required fuel efficiency. The former required automobile manufacturers to meet certain
levels of overall fuel efficiency of 27.5 miles per gallon for their entire fleet, while the latter
required that the manufacturers show that domestic and imported cars meet the fuel
efficiency separately, even if they satisfied "general average." The Gas Guzzler tax was
upheld as it was found non-discriminatory between foreign and domestic cars.'*^ In contrast,
the CAFE standard did not pass the scrutiny of Article III.'*"' The CAFE standard required
the application of tuna-ban analysis. In order to examine if Article XX would excuse the
CAFE standards, the Panel applied the "three step" formula. The Panel noted that while
"general average" scheme could be justified, the "separate foreign fleet" averaging was not
" First Tuna Panel, supra note 1, at 1619, para. 5.22.
'•° Panel Report on "United States Taxes on Automobiles", 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994) [hereinafter CAFE
Report].
'' 15U.S.C. §§2002-2013.
'- 26 U.S.C. §4064.
'^ CAFE Report, supra note 40, at 1452.
'^5ee/^. at 1456-57.
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compatible with Article XX(g). As both the standards—the "general average" and the
"separate foreign fleet" averaging were "inextricably linked," the Panel held that one may
not be excused while allowing other. More importantly, representing a clean departure from
the tuna-ban Panels, the CAFE Panel observed that in applying the "primarily aimed at"
standard for Article XX(g) which would have to render effective the measures,"*^ the
"efficiency" of the measure was not crucial for Article XX(g) analysis/^
D. The Reformulated Gasoline Case
It would seem that Venezuela and Brazil took the above "efficiency" argument a
little further in their complaint against the United States in the Reformulated Gasoline
case."*^ The Panel held that the Gasoline Rule, which established two baseline requirements
for refiners, blenders and importers of gasoline—individual baseline for domestic producers
and a tougher 'statutory' baseline for foreign producers—were inconsistent under the General
Agreement. Notably, the United States justified the Gasoline Rule under the General
Exceptions, namely Article XX (b) and (g).
'' See id.
'"Id at 1456.
"" Report of the Panel in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like Products of National Origin) 35 I.L.M. 274 ( 1996)[hereinafter the
Reformulated Gasoline easel. Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, the United States passed a regulation titled
"Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline", commonly
known as the "Gasoline Rule" whose purpose was to control to.xic and other pollution caused by the
combustion of gasoline manufactured in or imported into the United States. The 'Gasoline Rule' was
challenged by Venezuela and Brazil before a WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The Panel ruled against
the United States. The United States challenged the WTO Panel Report before the Appellate Body of the WTO.
Venezuela and Brazil therein argued that the measure must have "some positive conservation effort," to hold
that a measure is primarily related to the object of the measure. Report of the Appellate Body in United States
-- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 35 I.L.M. 603, 623 (1996)[hereinafter the Gasoline
Standards case]; see infra notes 120 to 134 and accompanying text.
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Like the tima-ban Panels, this Panel also applied a three-step analysis. However, that
this Panel's approach was flawed from the beginning is evident from the inappropriate
questions it posed itself. Thus, in order to examine the Gasoline Rule under Article XX(b).
the Panel framed the question which clearly ignored the "necessity of the environmental
objectives" and instead focused on the "inconsistent measures" already held invalid under
the Panel's Article III analysis.^* Referring to previous Panels which had interpreted the
meaning of the term "necessary,"'*'^ the Reformulated Gasoline Panel applied the same
interpretation and proceeded to examine whether United States could achieve the same
policy goals by less inconsistent alternatives. The United States stressed that it explored
other alternatives and, that such alternatives were not "feasible. "^° However, the Panel
rejected the United States' arguments since it found that the same policy objectives could
be achieved without discriminating between domestic and foreign gasoline and ruled that
the United States had failed to satisfy the test under Article XX(b).^'
With regard to Article XX(g), Venezuela claimed that "clean air" is not an
exhaustible natural resource falling within Article XX(g), because it is a "condition"of air
** Reformulated Gasoline case, supra note 47, at 296. The same flaw occurred in Article XX(g)
analysis which was pointed by the Appellate Body in the United States Standards case. See notes 120 to 127
and the accompanying text.
^^ Section 337 case, supra note 22, at para. 5.26; see also, Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15,
at para. 75.
'° Id. The United States maintained that "individual baseline" facility could not be extended to foreign
producers "because of (1) the impossibility of determining the refinery of origin for each imported shipment;
(2) the difficulty for the United States to exercise an enforcement jurisdiction with respect to a foreign
refinery, since the Gasoline Rule required criminal and civil sanctions in order to be effective." Id.
'• Id. at 298.
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that depend on its cleanliness.^- Rejecting this distinction, the Panel held that clean air is an
exhaustible natural resource. The Panel proceeded further to examine whether the Gasoline
Rule satisfied the requirements of"relating to" and "in conjunction with" of Article XX(g).
In a brief analysis, the Panel found that the Gasoline Rule did not satisfy the Article XX(g)
requirements. In its words:
The Panel saw no direct connection between less favorable treatment of imported
gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline, and the US objective of
improving air quality in the United States. Indeed, in the view of the Panel, being
consistent with the obligation to provide no less favorable treatment would not prevent
the attainment ofthe desired level of conservation of natural resources under the Gasoline
Rule."
E. Implications of GATT Panel Rulings
1. Scope of Article XX
The GATT Panels and in particular the tuna-ban Panels, by their interpretation, have
rephrased the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions. Thus, in effect. Article XX(b) and (g) may
be re-written as
".
. . . [NJothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of [any GATT-consistent] measures:
(b) necessary [that are reasonably available to it, or in the alternative, measures that are
least trade-restrictive] to protect human, animal or plant life or health [within its
jurisdiction];
" Id. at 299.
" Id. at 300.
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(g) relating to ["primarily aimed at"] the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are [aimed at primarily rendering effective such measures] in
conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption.
Such a narrow interpretation of the exceptions clause of the GATT has been widely
criticized. Nevertheless, the Tuna-ban Panels may not be criticized for expressing '"slippery
slope" concerns in their analysis. This has two dimensions. One is the application of the
measures outside the regulating party's jurisdiction; the other is the restrictions based on the
processes by which products are produced. Without doubt, these are legitimate concerns.
The first tuna-ban Panel took a narrow view with respect to both Articles XX (b) and (g),
while the second Panel relaxed the jurisdictional criterion. However, the Panels have erected
a rather strict test for Article XX(b) which likely will thwart any genuine environmentally
inspired measures. As such, even after the second tuna-ban Panel decision, the application
of an environmental measure outside a country's borders for the protection of global
commons is suspect.
Further, the tuna-ban Panel's interpretation of the term "necessary" which is taken
to mean "least-restrictive"^'' is considered problematic. As Professor Schoenbaum notes,^^
there are several problems with this interpretation. First, the term "necessary" is part of a
purpose clause whose object includes protection of living things. The "least-restrictive"
^'' 5ee Jackson, supra note 19, at 1240. Professor Jackson does not find the interpretation of the term
"necessary" as "least-restrictive" troubling. He points out that though this interpretation "impose[s] some
restraint" on the regulating nations, "it is considered important to prevent article XX from becoming a large
loop hole." Id The "slippery slope" concerns were alluded to by the tuna-ban Panels also.
^^ Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection ofthe Environment: The Continuing
Searchfor Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 276 (1997).
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interpretation wrongly places emphasis on measures, rather than on the protection of living
things. Second, it is unsupported by the framer's intent. Third, the Panels have wrongly
utilized the term "necessary'" to interpret Article XX(g) as well. Fourth, it has made it
unnecessary for the Panels to go to the third prong of their test. Fifth, it gives very little
deference to sovereignty issues. One way to resolve this difficulty is to follow a rule of
reason approach and thereby "lower the threshold" of entry to satisfy the test under Article
XX(g).^^
2. The Issue of Process and Production Methods (PPMs)
The tuna-dolphin controversy raised another contemporary issue - the issue of
whether trade restrictions can be imposed on products depending on the way they are
produced. The tuna-ban Panels' decision were not a surprise in view of a earlier Panel
decision in the Belgian Family Allowances case." The GATT has consistently outlawed the
measures that were based on PPMs. Indeed, there are many reasons to argue against the use
ofPPMs.'^
''Id
" GATT Panel Report, BISD, 1952. (A Belgian law levied a charge on foreign goods from a country
whose system of family allowances did not meet Belgian requirements. On challenge, a GATT Panel ruled
that discrimination on the basis of how products are produced is not permitted). For a discussion of this case,
see John H. Jackson, World Trade And The LawofGatt 585-86(1969).
'^ For example, see Schoenbaum, Comment on the Paper by Candice Stevens, in SUSTAINABLE
Development And International Law 249 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995)[hereinafter Sustainable
Development]. Schoenbaum refers to at least three reasons; first, "the principle of comparative advantage
upon which trade is based posits that nations should be able to derive benefits from their factor endowments";
second, it would lead to unilateral actions and chaos in world trade; third global harmonization is impracticable
and unwise economically. Id. See also Stevens, supra, at 239. Stevens identifies three primary reasons for
not allowing PPMs: economic, political and environmental. Id.
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59PPMs may be either product-relatedPPMs or non-product related PPMs Damage
to the enviromnent may be caused by both of them. In the product-related PPMs. the
production method changes the characteristics of the product which pollutes or degrades the
environment when it is consumed or used. This imposes consumption externalities.^^ On the
other hand, non-product related PPMs imposes production externalities and causes
environmental degradation in the producing country and/or in other countries.*'
The trade rules provide a comprehensive framework covering measures which
restrict trade on products. From the GATT perspective, the significant criteria for applying
trade rules is tied to the ''product" . Any distinction that is based on the product itself— that
is embodied in it and has as its final characteristics— is permissible. Such a distinction is
strongly rooted in the GATT and not surprisingly so since it is "legal instrument primarily
concerned with products."" Thus, a key interpretive term ~ the "like product" is found in
substantive provisions like Article I. III;2, 111:4 and other provisions. Even though the term
appears sixteen times*^ in the GATT, the term was not susceptible to precise definition but
^' Candice Stevens, Synthesis Report: Trade and Environment: PPM Issues [hereinafter Synthesis
Report] in TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS 7 (OECD DOCLTMENTS, 1994)
[hereinafter Oecd DOCUMENTS].
*° Id at 8.
^' Id. Stevens identifies four types of environmental problems that may be caused by the non-product
related PPMs. They are: Transboundary pollution; migratory species and shared living resources; global
environmental concerns; and, local environmental concerns. Id.
" Jackson, supra note 57, at 259.
" See 1970 WORKING PARTY REPORTON BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 1/3464, adopted on 2 December
1970, BISD 18S/97, 102, para. 18 [hereinafter WORKING Party Report].
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was left to be decided on a case-by-case basis. ^^ Several GATT Panels have grappled with
the issue. However, the criteria by which a product is a like or unlike product is Hmited to
the physical characteristics of the product and does not include the processes. ^^ Attempts
by some Member States to include measures based on non-product distinctions have
generally been rejected. ^^
In addition to the GATT, two other agreements deal specifically with product PPMs:
the Technical Barriers to Trade^^ (TBT) or the Standards Code, and the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).^^ While the SPS Agreement
deals with additives, contaminants, toxins and disease-carrying organisms in food, beverages
and feedstuffs, the Standards Code covers all other products.^^ Both these agreements have
incorporated conditions against misuse. Broadly, for a measure to be satisfied under the SPS
Agreement, the measure should be "necessary,"™ under which six requirements have been
*' See Working Party Report , supra note 63. See also "Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and
Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages" BISD 34S/83, 1 15, para. 5.6 (adopted on
10 November 1987).
^ See Reformulated Gasoline case, supra note 47, at 294. On the question whether imported and
domestic gasoline were like products under Article 111:4, the United States tried to persuade that the "situation
of the producers" should be taken into account. The Reformulated Gasoline Panel rejected this line of
reasoning. Id.
^^ Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade[hereinafter Standards Code], reprinted in JOHN H.
Jackson et al.. Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of International Economic Relations
149 (3d. ed., 1995). [hereinafter Documents Supplement].
** Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
Supplement, supra note 67, at 121 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
^' Schoenbaum, supra note 55, at 284.
™ SPS Agreements, supra note 68, Art. 2:1, 2:2.
identified/' First, the measures must "not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
their appropriate level of . . . protection."''" Second, any measure shall be applied "only to
the extent necessary" to protect human, animal or plant life and health.''^ Third, a measure
must be based on "scientific principles" and "sufficient scientific evidence."^"* Fourth, the
SPS Agreement urges parties to base their measures on a risk assessment process "taking into
account" available scientific evidence and economic factors, including the objective of
minimizing negative trade effects/'* Fifth, the SPS Agreement repeats the requirements of
the chapeau of Article XX, that the measure must not be "arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate between members" and must not be a "disguised restriction on international
trade."'^ Sixth, there is an obligation at least to consider adopting intemational SPS standards
in the interests of achieving harmonization. However, a member State has discretion to set
higher standards. ^^ Likewise, the Standards Code allows measures that do not create
"unnecessary obstacles to intemational trade" and those that are not "more restrictive than
necessary."''^ Indeed, the TBT Agreement uses the term "processes and production
^' Schoenbaum, supra note 55, at 285.
'^ SPS Agreements, supra note 68, Art. 5:6.
"/c/. at Art. 2:2.
'Ud.
" Id. at Art. 5.
''/J. at Art. 2:3.
"/(i. at Art. 3.
'* Standards Code, supra note 67, at Art. 2:2.
methods." ^'^ However, this covers only the "processing or production of a product that have
an effect on the final characteristics of the product or affect its quality or performance."*"^
Thus, it is seen that an elaborate framework has been created for product-related PPM
measures. Moreover, both these Agreements do not apply extraterritorially.'*' Absence of any
reference to non-product related PPM measures might be taken as reflecting the strong
policy commitment of the GATT members not to allow such measures.
In general, non-product PPMs should be proscribed. Given the potential for abuse of
the PPMs~for protectionist and non-environmental factors— it is not hard to imagine it
would be an "invitation to chaos in world trade."*" Different countries have different
endowments and differences in productions and processes methods form an integral part of
comparative advantage. Some view the differences in environmental standards as a matter
of competitiveness and suggest remedies.*^ Indeed, one principle which has considerable
^' Stevens, supra note 58, at 24 1
.
*° Chakarian, 5Mpra note 59, at 115.
*' Schoenbaum, supra note 58, at 251.
'^ Jackson, supra note 57, at 74 1 . "Article XX . . . contain a series of exceptions that may be the most
troublesome and most subject to abuse of all GATT exceptions." Id.
*^ Typically, environmental measures are motivated in part due to concerns that producers in countries
with lower environmental standards get a competitive advantage over producers in countries that have higher
environmental standards. The shrimp ban is an illustration where the United States shrimp industry expressed
competitiveness concerns. See chapter IV infra. In order to level the playing field, the use of PPMs is not an
appropriate method, and sure enough not GATT consistent. One approach might be to look "within" and
remove the regulatory and legal inefficiencies in the regulating state. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental
Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L. J. 2039, 2049 (1993). To combat competitiveness
concerns, rather than use unilateral measures, Stewart advocates that the United States "should seek to reduce
the excessive costs and burdens imposed by its exceptionally rigid, legalistic system of environmental law and
administration." Id.
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agreement among the scholars —Polluter Pays Principle*"* —could address these concerns
appropriately. Furthermore, environmentalists would point out the non-product related
PPMs are targeted against environmentally unsustainable or dirty production means. Here,
two problems may be encountered. First, the target of protection chosen might reflect a
value judgment of the regulating country.**^ This clearly raises sovereignty issues as it raises
for some others, issues that are "fundamentally about democracy."*^ Second, the possibility
of banning products unrelated to the target "product." Protagonists would bring an
*"* The Polluter Pays Principle "refers to the requirement that the costs of pollution should be borne
by the person or persons responsible for causing the pollution and the consequential costs." Phillippe Sands,
supra note 58, at 66. Representing the international acceptance of the principle. Principle 16 of the Rio
Declaration states: "National authorities should endeavor to promote the internationalization of environmental
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international
trade and investment." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Adopted June 14, 1992, at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, UN DOC. A/CONF. 151/5
Rev. 1
., reprinted in 3 1 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992) ; see ESTY, supra note 1, at 176; Schoenbaum, supra note 55,
at 295-98. Pointing out that this is "one economic principle that both ardent environmentalists and committed
free traders can agree on". Professor Schoenbaum argues that the WTO should adopt this Principle. Id. at 296.
See also Steve Chamovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL iNT'L
L.J. 459, 505(1994).
*' See Charles T. Haag, Comment, Legitimizing "Environmental" Legislation Under the GATT in
Light of the CAFE Panel Report: More Fuel for Protectionists? 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 57, 90 (1995). "For
example, environmentalists in the United States may feel that a South American country's manufacturing
practice, which kills frogs, should be stopped. . . . Should environmentalists in one country be allowed under
the GATT to restrict trade with the South American country in this example based on a concern for frogs?
GATT Panels examining analogous situations have said no." /c/ (footnotes omitted).
** William J. Snape & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are
"Process Standards" Getting "Due Process''". 27 CORNELL iNT'L L. J. 777, 781 (1994). "[T]he debate over
PPMs and much of the trade/environment relationship is fundamentally about democracy. Who decides when
and why trade restrictions based on PPMs are appropriate? Citizens of a country speaking through their
legislature? Or an international trade organization, directly accountable only to member governments and
career bureaucrats?" Id. Indeed, these are fundamental questions; questions that beg the answer.
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"effectiveness" argument.*^ However, under the existing rules, it is hard to distinguish
between good PPMs from bad ones.** Consequently, its use must be limited. However, some
principled exceptions may be allowed for the protection of truly "global commons." One way
is to adopt measures pursuant to MEAs. This has been indicated by the tuna-ban Panels, but
has not been clearly articulated.
In defense of the PPMs. it may be argued that the GATT text does not support any
limitation for the use ofPPM measures. In the analysis of "like product," Professor Jackson
points out that the GATT has used different phrases instead of one term such as the "like
product." Terms including "like commodity"*^, "like merchandise"''"; "like or competitive
products"^' ; "like or directly competitive products"^" ; "directly competitive or substitutable
product"''^ are used in different articles of the GATT. The interpretation should be
^^ Stevens, supra note 59, at 17. Stevens points out that the "effectiveness of PPM-based trade
measures will depend on, among other things, 1 ) the relative market power of the country or countries taking
the measure, 2) the type of trade instrument, and 3) the policy package or combination of measures." Id.
** Schoenbaum, 5«p/-a note 55, at 291.
*' Art. VI, para. 7, GATT.
'° Art. Vll, para. 2, GATT.
" Art. XIX, para. 1,GATT.
'- Art. XIX, para. 1,GATT.
'' Art. 111:2, GATT.
harmonized with the purpose of the article in which the term appears.*^^ The WTO Appellate
Body took the same view in the Japan Shochit^ case.
Thus, if the purpose of the article is more or less determinative of the "likeness" of
the product; and, if the term "like product" has been used sixteen times in the document when
the framers intended to specify that any regulation or taxes apply only to products, it is
worth noting the absence of the term "like product" in Article XX. In contrast, for example.
Article XI also uses the word "measures" when it extends its application to "other measures
. . .
instituted or maintained on the importation or exportation ... of any product ""^^ Thus,
the measures under Article XI are limited to "products". Arguably, measures may be
construed as a broader criteria that encompasses trade restrictions even though such measures
are not strictly product related. ^^ If such was the intention, the drafters could have brought
in the concept of product and specifically limited Article XX measures only to products.
Put differently, if the text of Article XX does not seem to limit the measures solely to
products, it may arguably extend to non-products, that is processes as well. The limitations
imposed are stated in the conditions against misuse. However, as pointed out above, the use
"^ Jackson, supra note 57, at 263.
'^ Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. AB - 1996-2 (Oct. 4
1996) [hereinafter Japan Shochu case]. The concept of "like product" was given a meaning that added
flexibility for interpretation of same. As the Panel noted, the "likeness" of the product is comparable to "the
accordion that stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO agreement are
applied." Id. at 20.
'*' Emphasis added.
"^ 5ee eg, Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, May 4, 1988, GATT BISD 1 16 (35th Supp. 1989). The
Panel interpreted the term "measures" to "refer not only to laws and regulations, but also, more broadly, even
to nonmandatory government involvement." Schoenbaum, supra no\Q 5A, dXllli. Canada-Administration
of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT BISD 140 (30th Supp. 1984)(interpreting Article
XI "measures" as one excluding "internal requirements" that fall under Article III).
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of PPMs ought to be limited to domestic enviromnents. Its use in foreign environments is
problematic.
Rather than pursue the PPMs, member States must seriously pursue alternative
approaches. There are no dearth of alternatives. Solutions suggested include: "(1)
international environmental agreements, (2) environmental management systems, (3) eco-
labelling, (4) the "polluter pays" principle and, (5) investment standards."*^*
3. Unilateral Trade Measures as a Conservation Policy
Closely tied with the issue of PPMs is the issue of whether unilateral measures can
be allowed. It was seen that both tuna-ban Panels have rejected use of unilateral measures
by the United States. Though some commentators have attempted to define what is
"unilateral action"^^ and distinguish it from "extra-territorial jurisdiction" '°° action, it is not
relevant for the purpose of our analysis. Indeed, the tuna-ban and subsequent Panels have
used the term "extra-jurisdictional" as opposed to "extra-territorial" which is considered
'* Schoenbaum, supra note 55, at 291
.
"
"Unilateral action" means a nation state's use of its administrative and enforcement agencies to
secure a policy goal set by its domestic political process." Anderson, supra note 19, at 754. In contrast, when
two or more nations coordinate the "use of their administrative and enforcement agencies to secure a policy
goal set in an international forum" it is a "multilateral action." Id. However, Anderson agrees that the "nation
state that unilaterally imposes trade measures for extra-territorial environmental protection is the "unilateral
actor." Id.
'°° Anderson, supra note 19, at 755. "When a nation state exercises its legislative, adjudicative, or
enforcement authority beyond its borders, either over its citizens of other countries or over its own nationals,
it exercises "extraterritorial jurisdiction." Of course, any trade regulation affects trade partners and, thus, has
extraterritorial ramifications. However, the important distinction is that exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction
command or compel results beyond nation state's borders, but trade measures merely induce or influence
results beyond its borders." Id.
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"salutary." '°' A measure that is predicated on the poHcy of a single actor in a
bilateral/multilateral issue and seeking to change other actors' policy in line with its own is
not well taken. '°" Even in the era of compromised sovereignty, unilateral actions must be
remain proscribed. In as much as it is effective, unfortunately, unilateral actions can be used
variously depending on the perceptions of the user.'°^ It can be pressed forward by interest
groups which want freer trade and open markets, or by interest groups which seek to protect
their domestic industries. '^'^ It could be used for environmental concetfAs. Some
commentators view the issue as not whether unilateral actions should be allowed, but rather
'°' Schoenbaum, supra note 55, at 280. "[TJhe Tuna/Dolphin II panel distinguished between
extraterritorial and extrajurisdictional application of article XX." Id. Professor Schoenbaum believes that
"extra-territorial" measures are allowable under the norms of international law, but not "extra-jurisdictional"
measures; and thus, the Panel's conclusion is "essentially correct." Id. For a contrary view, see Steve
Chamovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 496-97 (1993).
"[T]he panel did not offer any definition of an extrajurisdictional offense, even though the panel apparently
invented this term." Moreover, the Panel's argument based on 1988 GATT Panel rather than on historical
evidence is unpersuasive. Id.
'°^ Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium or Imbalance?
17 Mich. J. INT'L L. 563 (1996). "If past is any guide, unilateral measures are far more likely to inspire
GATT/WTO dispute settlement challenges than multilateral environmental protection efforts . . . and no
national measure taken pursuant to a multilateral environmental agreement has ever been challenged in the
GATT/WTO." Id. at 574 (footnotes omitted).
'°^ Id. at 574. "[W]hat one perceives as unilateralism can well be interpreted as leadership by
another."
'"'' The use of "section 301" of the United States trade law is a good example. It has been used
frequently against "other countries in order to influence their policies and/or practices." Reinstein, supra note
58, at 223.
'°^ See generally Gerald Brooks, Environmental Economics and International Trade: An Adaptive
Approach. 5 GEO. iNT'L Envtl. L. Rev. 277 (1993). "Section 301. . . is the . . . most useful [instrument] for
advancing environmental objectives and competitiveness concerns." Id. at 303. Brooks agrees that "section
301 are unilateral measures that may be subject to challenges under the GATT. However, unless defeated by
a GATT determination", section 301 may be pursued. Id. Such an approach would undermine and weaken the
system. Besides, the approach ignores numerous other issues such as 'sovereignty', equity and the like.
under what circumstances should they be allowed. '°^ The key problem lies in determining the
good from the bad. Its frequent use reflects the existence of a power-oriented system rather
than a rule-oriented regime'"' and erodes the credibility of the system and weakens it in the
long run. '°^
However, unilateralism is not without its virtues."^'' Even commentators who strongly
advocate a balanced approach to the trade/environment conflict agree that if other
altematives do not work as expected, then as a last resort, member states could use "creative
unilateralism" "° or "creative illegalit}'."'" Indeed, at the very least, a measure should not be
'"^ See Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A
Commentary. 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 733 (1992); see also Anderson, supra note 19, at 753; Schoenbaum,
supra note 55 at 299-30 1 ; David A. Wirth, The International Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal
States: How Close A Fit:' 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1392 (1992).
'°^ See John H. JacKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE Gatt System 49-54 (1994); Schoenbaum, Free
International Trade and Protection ofthe Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 AM. J. iNT'L L. 700, 723
(1992). "[I]f unilateral trade restriction were permitted for environmental reasons, they could also be used to
combat all manner of national socioeconomic policies. Permitting such actions would reduce international
trade to a power-based regime." Id.
108 See McDonald, supra note 29, at 468-69.
"^ Jackson, supra note 107, at 5 1 . Professor Jackson acknowledges that unilateral actions could be
useful in situations where the "international 'rule' is patently unfair or bad policy" or "because the current
international rule-making process is faulty" or when "reform of the rule is badly needed, but the international
and national institutional system for some reason makes the reform impossible." Id. at 5 1 . One case where this
worked is the US's departure from the "currency par value system of the IMF" which eventually lead to the
"floating exchange rates" advocated for decades by leading economists." Id. However, Professor Jackson
rightfully acknowledges that allowing such "stimulating improvements" of a docile system undermines the
system and leaves it weakened. Id. See also ESTY, supra note 1, at 144. "The intrinsic difficulty of
multilateral decision making and the lack of existing institutional structures for effective international
environmental policymaking . . . makes unilateral action a necessary, if unfortunate, policy option in some
circumstances." Id.
"° Schoenbaum, supra note 55, at 299. Professor Schoenbaum points out "atleast two theoretical
justifications for "creative" unilateral action." First is the "doctrine of opposability" which helps "clarify grey
areas" and serves as a catalyst and "an important part of the international law "legislative" process." Second,
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dismissed merely because it is unilaterally pursued. Regrettably however, unilateral actions
have typically been the prerogative of developed countries because the strength and
effectiveness of trade restrictions rests largely on the economic and market power."" The
targets of such unilateral action are usually the developing countries. Besides raising the
north-south issues,"^ it also raises issues of equity between trading partners. In the context
of the current debate, perhaps the most troubling factor is the unilateral determination of
production standards to be adopted or used by exporting countries. The tuna-dolphin and the
turtle-shrimp disputes are illustrative. Protagonists of free trade would argue that production
methods form part of the comparative advantage of countries."'* Nevertheless,
environmentalists have a valid argument in that they insist not on a particular method of
production; rather they urge production methods that are environmentally sustainable. In
practice however, the unilateral actor compels the use of similar production technologies by
other countries."^ Further, the "urgency" of the targeted problem is presumed."^
unilateral act may be justified as a "countermeasure." Id.
'"McDonald, 5upra note 29, at 468-69.
"- Stevens, supra note 59, at 17.
"^ See generally Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Perspectives ofDeveloping Countries in
Unep/Trade and the Environment <http://www.unep.ch/t&e/epoc.html> (visited 03/26/96).
"•^ For e.g., see Jackson, supra note 19, at 1244.
"^ For example, in the shrimp ban dispute, see chapter IV, infra, the United States expects all shrimp
harvesting nations to use Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs). The TEDs are used by the US shrimp fishing
industry.
"'5ee Anderson, supra note 19, at 753. "[Tjhe urgency of global ecological problems has compelled
the international community to recognize that unilateral action in the form of trade measure is preferable to
global paralysis." In most cases, the urgency of the problem is presumed. This should be avoided by letting
the regulating country to prove that there is urgency. For example, reliance on international agreements such
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To be sure, the better approach to persuade countries to adopt environment
sustainabihty is trade "carrots" rather than trade "sticks.""^ Forcing developing countries that
do not have the technological capabilities or the resources to adopt environmental production
standards comparable to that of the developed countries creates tension in the system and
does more harm than good."^ Moreover, such unilateral "sticks" are viewed as "eco-
imperialism""'' and merely draw at best an unenthusiastic response and dampened
implementation.
F. The Gasoline Standards Case
Under the GATT 1994, a forum to which the decisions of the Panels may be
challenged was created in the Appellate Body, the benefit of which was seen when the
United States appealed the Reformulated Gasoline case to the WTO Appellate Body.'"" The
United States limited its challenge to two of the Panel's findings.'"' First, the holding with
as the CITES which categorizes the endangered or threatened species, could validate measures.
"^5ee Trade and the Environment: A Report prepared by the GATT Secretariat, (1992), excerpted
in John H. Jackson et al.. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 561 (3d. ed., 1995).
But see Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83
Geo. L.J. 2131, 2149-64 (1995). Chang argues that "carrots" and "sticks" should be used simultaneously; he
believes "sticks deter overuse of the environment" while "carrots create perverse incentive." Id. at 2153.
"' See Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PrOBS. 175, 210 (1996).
"' Jackson, 5Mpra note 19, at 1241. The term "eco-imperialism" represents the concern that "powerful
and wealthy countries will impose their own views regarding environmental or other social or welfare
standards on other parts of the world, even where such views may not be entirely appropriate." Id.
''° The Gasoline Standards case, supra note 47. The introduction of a Appellate Body review has
been praised as perhaps the "most significant step toward the creation of an international legal tribunal on
trade." Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Orderfor World Tradel' 16 MiCH.
J. INT'L 349,379(1995).
'^' See notes 47 to 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Reformulated Gasoline case.
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respect to Article XX(g) and second, the Panel's interpretation of Article XX as a whole.
Notably, the finding under Article XX(b) was not challenged.
1. Article XX(g) Analysis
The Appellate Body began its analysis with the test under the phrase "relating to" to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. After finding that the test applied was
correct, the Appellate Body took particular exception to the erroneous application of the test
and the reasoning employed by the Panel. Instead of testing the measure at issue, the Panel
erroneously tested the legal conclusion arrived at under the "inland parity" analysis. This
results in turning Article XX inside out.'" Moreover, the Panel also erred in misapplying
the "necessary" standard applicable under Article XX(b) to Article XX(g).
In holding that the Baseline Establishment Rule (part of the larger Gasoline Rule)
fell within the meaning of the term ''relating to,"'"^ the Appellate Body pointed out that the
measure must be taken as a whole and analyzed. In other words, the "means" used by the
measure must relate to the "objective" of the measure. If such a relationship exists, then the
measure would satisfy the test of "relating to."'""*
The Appellate Body then proceeded to test the measure with the other requirement
of Article XX(g)~ "made effective in conjunction with" requirement, which the
Reformulated Gasoline Panel had found unnecessary to investigate since the United States
measure failed the "relating to" test. Venezuela and Brazil claimed that "made effective" has
been interpreted to mean "primarily aimed at" making the domestic consumption or
'^^ The Gasoline Standards case, supra note 47, at 602.
•"/^. at 623.
'^^ Id.
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production effective. Further, it argued that in order to be "properly regarded as "primarily
aimed at' the conservation of natural resources, the baseline establishment rules must not
only "reflect a conservation purpose" but also be shown to have had "some positive
conservation effect.""'"' Rejecting this line of reasoning, the Appellate Body held that "made
effective' refers to the measures being "operative, as "in force" or as having ""come into
effect."'"^ Likewise, ""in conjunction with" should be read as "together with" or ""jointly
with." Thus viewed, the second part of Article XX(g) does not require a post prandial
analysis. Rather, it is a "requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions,
in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural
resources.
2. The Chapeau Analysis
Having found that the Baseline Rule satisfied Article XX(g), the Appellate Body then
set out to analyze the requirements under the preamble to Article XX, referred to as Chapeau.
In this regard, the Appellate Body stated that in order to fall under Article XX:
[T]he measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular
exceptions—paragraph (a) to (j) ~ listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the
requirements imposed in the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other
words, two-tiered; first, provisional justification by reason of characterization of the
measure under Article XX(g);second, further appraisal of the same measure under the
introductory clauses of Article XX.'"*
'" Id.
•2^ Id.
'" Id. at 625.
'2« Id. at 626.
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More importantly, the Appellate Body held that the Article XX chapeau provisions must
be tested on its own standards and not on the standards set out in the substantive provisions
of the General Agreement.'-^ In its view, "such a recourse would also confuse the question
whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the hirther and separate question
arising under the chapeau of article XX as to whether that inconsistency was nevertheless
justified.'"''^
The Appellate Body then proceeded to examine the adequacy of alternatives. It
realized that more than one alternative was available to the United States which were non-
discriminatory.'^' The Appellate Body was unpersuaded by the reasons put forth by the
United States as to why other alternatives were not favored over the measure at issue. In this
regard, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's finding. Finally, the Appellate Body
concluded that the Gasoline Rule was an "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised
restriction" on trade. '^"
It is now clear that the chapeau has its own standards. Consequently, the content and
scope of the chapeau becomes important. As the chapeau stipulates, a measure at issue
should not constitute
(a) arbitrary discrimination, where same conditions prevail ; or
(b) unjustifiable discrimination; or
(c) disguised restriction.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 629.
13: Id at 633.
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In an effort to clarify as to how the above standards may operate, the Appellate Body
wondered whether those standards have "different fields of application."'^' With regard to
the first standard, i.e, "arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail." the Appellate Body asked itself ifthe phrase referred only to conditions in exporting
countries, or both exporting and importing countries, or only between exporting countries
inter se. This question was left unanswered. However, the Appellate Body pointed out that
the exceptions listed under Article XX relate not just to the "inland parity" and '"foreign
parity" but to all the obligations under the General Agreement. Such an interpretation is
made possible by the wording ''nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party ofmeasures ..." Lastly, the Appellate
Body ruled that
"arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination: and "disguised restriction on
international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one
another. It is clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in
international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or
discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of "disguised
restriction."'^^
G. A New Road Ahead
The Appellate Body's decision in the Reformulated Gasoline case will have a
significant impact on the policy debate between trade and the environment. Indeed, it has
pointed out many anomalies in the Panel's decision which led to a wrong conclusion. First,
it cleared the confusion by pointing out that the "inland parity" and "foreign parity" standards
'" Id.
"' Id. at 629.
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and the Article XX exceptions are distinct and may not be mixed. This has led to some
erroneous application of Article XX standards. Also representing a clear departure from the
tuna-ban analysis, the Appellate Body has interpreted Article XX(g) and introduced a
standard that is more lenient than the existing tuna-ban standards. The earlier Panels not
only followed the 'primarily aimed at" test for both "relating to" and the second part of
Article XX(g), but also wrongly applied the "necessary" test to Article XX(g). Thus viewed,
"primarily aimed at" meant that the conservation efforts should be made effective by
limitations on domestic consumption or production. This posed a hurdle hard to clear. The
Appellate Body rejected that standard and has injected a more relaxed standard.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has clarified that Article XX requires a two-tier
approach. It has also specified the order to be followed. Indeed, as Professor Schoenbaum
notes, the "chapeau" has been discovered with a vengeance. "'^^ While this gives new
meaning to the Article XX exceptions, however, the Appellate Body has not clearly
articulated the proposition that Article XX General Exceptions should constitute a separate
framework of analysis. '^^ This can only be inferred from the decision.
It was seen that the treatment of environmental measures under the Appellate Body
analysis has departed considerably from the tuna-dolphin decisions. Nevertheless, in the
absence of a "general agreement" on environment, the WTO Panels could continue to "given
effect to the purposes and objects" of the General Agreement,'^^ on a "case-by-case
'" Schoenbaum, supra note 55, at 274.
'^^ See Donald M. Goldberg, GATT Tuna-Dolphin II:Environmental Protection Continues to Clash
With Free Trade - Part II
,
<http://www.econet.apc.org/ciel/issue2b.html> (visited 06/19/96).
'" The Gasoline Standards case, supra note 47, at 622.
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basis." '^^ Moreover, even though there is every reason to believe that the World Trade
Organization can accommodate trade and environmental issues, harmonization efforts are
slow. To facilitate such an integration, a proper "standard of review" must be framed. The
Appellate Body Review provides such an opportunity. Unlike the adhoc panels, the
Appellate Body "judges" are chosen for a period of two to four year terms. The seven
member Appellate Body is comprised of "persons ofrecognized authority, with demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally."
'^^ They can "determine questions oflaw and legal interpretation"; thus, they have
the unique opportunity to be creative and foster integration of trade and the environment by
rightly placing environmental concerns on par with trade concerns.
Having demonstrated the need for, or the lack of, a standard of review that would
more readily reconcile trade and environment conflicts, the next chapter focuses on the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Supreme Court of the United States.
The chapter will examine the case law of both jurisdictions with a view to identify the
principles and find out how conflicts between the two policy goals are resolved. It will be
seen that both the systems have developed a clear and deliberate balancing of the two goals.
Finally, an analysis is made to explore if we could adopt the salient principles of the rule of
reason approach to add to and enhance the ability of the WTO to address and reconcile
environment and trade issues.
'^« Id.
'^' Art. 17, para. 3, UNDERSTANDING ON Rules AND Procedure Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
,
in Jackson, supra note 67, at 366.
CHAPTER III
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
A RULE OF REASON APPROACH
A. Introduction
The rule of reason is a well recognized concept under the antitrust jurisprudence of
the United States.' The Sherman Antitrust Act. proscribes agreements that restrain
competition. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal."^ Read literally, section 1 condemns
"every contract" that restrains trade. And testing for the legality of the contract under the
'per se' rule was a categorical condemnation of any contract that restrained trade, resulting
in practical difficulties. Even though the Courts found that per se rules are "easily applied
and easily understood" and "judicially efficient," it was "rigid and formalistic" resulting in
invalidating both good and bad practices.'* The rule of reason, which was formulated in the
' Eleanor M. Fox& Lawrence A.Sullivan, Cases and Materials on Antitrust 69-98 (1989).
^ 15U.S.C., § 1 (1988).
'Id.
* See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense ofthe Rule ofReason: A New Standardfor Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1753, 1756 (1994).
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beginning of the twentieth century/ introduced "judicial flexibihty" that was needed to
advance the goals of antitrust law.^ The rule of reason analysis required courts "to balance
the potential pro-competitive benefits of the challenged practice against the competitive
harms that may result from the challenged practice."' Though the doctrine has taken several
formulations through the years,^ for the purpose of this analysis, it will suffice to note that
the overriding theme of the rule of reason is the need to balance the contending goals. The
rule of reason concept in antitrust law lends itself easily to the resolution of conflict between
trade and environment. Antitrust law characterized as the 'magna carta' of economic liberty,^
stands for free and fair competition, like the GATT/WTO which has identical aims at a
^ One of the early rule of reason cases is Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
Subsequently, in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, (1918), Justice Brandeis, who is
credited for articulating the Rule of Reason analysis, observed that "the legality of an agreement or regulation
cannot be determined by so simple a test [such as the per se rule] .... Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Id
^ See William J. Sims, Note, NCAA w Board ofRegents and a Truncated Rule ofReason: Retaining
Flexibility Without Sacrificing Efficiency. 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 196-97(1985).
' Id at n.4.
* See Peter W. Bellas, Comment, NCAA v. Board ofRegents Supreme Court Intercepts Per Se Rule
and Rule ofReason, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 540 (1985). Traditionally, the rule of reason requires a "market
power" analysis. To apply the rule of reason, several factors are analyzed. The analysis includes factors such
as "the circumstances peculiar to the defendant's business, the condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, the nature and purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effect of the restraint" are considered."
Piraino, supra note 4, at 1 76 1 . The European Court of Justice however took a very limited approach. It took
the rule of reason as a doctrine that fundamentally involves a balancing of benefits against harm. For a further
discussion of the European Court's treatment of the rule of reason, see infra.
'United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972)("Antitrust laws in general, and the [United
States] Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise").
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global level. It will be seen that the GATT/WTO, which is a "rule-oriented" regime,
deserves the much needed flexibility the rule of reason affords. '°
Indeed, the GATT/WTO Panels have used the rule of reason approach, albeit in a
non-structured way." In comparison with section 1 of the Sherman Act and a rule of reason
analysis, Article XX exceptions in the GATTAVTO may very well provide a framework for
such an analysis. In the tuna-ban analysis, the GATT Panels' examination of the United
States' regulations and the legislative object and scope of it is a clear application of the rule
of reason approach. However, as mentioned above, the application of the rule of reason
analysis must be made in a structured way.
As Professor Schoenbaum notes, there is a paucity ofGATT determinations under
the rule of reason rubric.'" In this regard, it may be instructive to look into how the United
States and the European Union have dealt with the issues of trade and environment conflict.
Despite "vital contextual and institutional differences," the United States and the European
Union share a common feature: division of governmental powers between central and
local/state authorities.'^ Notably, the two systems have relied on their courts to advance their
'° See generally Bellas, supra note 8.
" See Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection
in the New World Order, 23 Envtl. L. 397, 434 ( 1 993).
^'See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection ofthe Environment:
Irreconcilable Conflict?. 86 AM J. INT'L L. 700, 715(1 992).
'^ See Terrance Sandalow &. Eric Stein, Two Systems: An Overview, in COURTS AND FREE MARKETS:
Perspectives From the United States And Europe 3 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., vol. 1 , 1982).
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goals. '^ The principles evolved by the "highly respected" legal institutions of the United
States and the European Union may provide a useful framework for our analysis.
The United States is a classic example of a federal entity with an integrated market
based on free trade between the States of the federation. Similarly, the European Union
consists of a group of States representing a single market based on free trade across
national borders.'^ Though there are some differences',^ the approaches to the trade and
environment conflict are identical in that both have acknowledged the importance of
environmental concerns and have ensured a high level of protection of the environment even
if it results in disruption of free trade. In that process, both the Courts have adopted a
conceptual framework within which to decide the issues. Such an approach is lacking under
the GATTAVTO dispute resolution system. At its best, it is in the process of development.
It needs to be strengthened.
B. The Rule of Reason Approach of the European Union
1. The Free Movement of Goods Principle
'^ But see Steve Chamovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27
Cornell Int'l L. J. 459, 482 (1994). Chamovitz cautions that the adjudicative approach of the United States
and the European Union are "not transferable to the GATT" because the former institutions are highly
respected institutions, which is not so with the GATT Panels. Id. Such a view, however, is unsupported by
evidence. On the contrary, the WTO Panels decide issues of worldwide importance and as such are binding
on the parties until the decision is overruled. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
658,659(1996).
'^ Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in An Integrated Market: A Survey
ofthe Case Law ofthe United States Supreme Court and the European Court ofJustice, 2 J. TraNSNAT'L
&P0L'Y141, 143(1993).
'^ For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two systems, see Stein & Sandalow,
supra note 12, at 4.
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The European Union is "ambitious" in terms of achieving the goal of a single
market.'^ Toward that goal. Articles 30 and 34 of the European Treaty ensure the free
movement of goods across its member States. Article 30 states that "Quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to
the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States."'* Similarly, Article 34
states: "Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent effect, shall
be prohibited between Member States."'^ Together, they prohibit quantitative restrictions on
exports and imports. ^° The zeal with which the free movement of goods principle was
sought to be enforced is reflected in the European Court's ruling in the landmark decision of
the Dassonville case"' where it drew a wide circle for the "measures having equivalent
effect". The European Court held: "All trading rules enacted by Member States which are
capable of hindering, directly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions."^^ Thus,
even potential hindrance was not tolerated. Such a high policy commitment was not reflected
toward the environment in the formative years of the European Union.
" Hession and Macrory, Balancing Trade Freedom with Sustainable Development, in THE EUROPEAN
Union and World Trade Law After the Gatt Uruguay Round 189 (Nicholas Emiliou & David
O'Keeffe eds., 1996).
'* Art. 30, European Union Treaty.
" Art. 34, European Union Treaty.
^° Peter Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the European Community under Articles 30
TO 34 OF THE Rome Treaty 61 (3d. ed., 1996).
^' Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837.
'^ Id. at 852.
53
2. Environmental Policy of the European Union
Like in the GATT/WTO, environment was not an explicitly recognized policy in the
European Union. Rather, it's environmental policy that we see today took shape in three
stages."^ In the first stage, environmental policy was unsupported by the treaty provisions.
The second stage from the Single European Act in 1987 to that of the European Union Treaty
evidenced a growth of legal basis for the environmental policy. The third phase which
started with the entry into force of the European Union Treaty characterizes a strong policy
commitment to "achieve environmental protection and sustainable development."""* Article
13 Or, para. 2 of the European Union Treaty sets out the basic environmental policy of the
Community.
Under European Union law, a provision similar to Article XX of the GATT is Article
36 of the European Union Treaty. Article 36 provides:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animal or plants; the protection
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restriction shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. "^
It is seen that the Treaty provides a catalog of exceptions in Article 36 under which
member States may use national measures to protect the life and health of humans, animals
^^ Joachim Scherer, Regional Perspectives on Trade and the Environment: The European Union, in
Sustainable Development and International Law 254 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995).
" Art. 36, European Union Treaty.
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and plants as well as for other selected reasons.-^^ Nevertheless, the word "environment" has
not been explicitly mentioned and as such, it may not be an adequate means to safeguard the
environment.
3. The Theory of Mandatory Requirements
As mentioned above, the European Court had interpreted Article 30 very widely in
a way that was hard to tell "where the reach of this branch ofEC law 'stops'"."^ The classic
case in which the European Court moderated its Dassonville ruling and developed the 'Rule
of Reason' was the Cassis de Dijon case.^^ The European Court said:
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting in disparities between
the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted
in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,
the protection of health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the
consumer.'^
This case arose when the Federal Republic of Germany slapped an import ban on alcoholic
beverages from the Member States which did not contain a minimum of 25 percent alcohol
content. Relying on Article 36, the German government claimed that the restriction was
necessary in order to protect the public health, because non-German alcoholic beverages had
a lower-proof which allegedly induced a tolerance towards alcohol than those with a higher
-* Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community 61
(1996).
-^Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EC Law:Text, Cases, And Materials 584 (1995).
^* Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein {Cassis de Dijon),
1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979)[hereinafter Cassis].
^"Id. at 692.
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alcohol content. ^° Germany also claimed that the tax rate was lower on the lower-proof
beverages; thus the producers of lower proof alcoholic beverages had an unfair advantage
over the producers of higher proof alcoholic beverages.
The European Court rejected both the arguments. To reject the alcohol tolerance
argument of Germany, the European Court did not make any effort to go into scientific
evidence. Rather, it rested it's reasoning on the facts. Indeed, the European Court found
that, in practice, much of the higher proof alcohol was consumed after it was diluted:
consequently, it was unnecessary to examine the scientific basis of 'tolerance inducement'
claim of Germany. With regard to the 'unfair advantage' argument, the European Court
pointed that Germany could have achieved the result of a 'level-playing field' for both
producers of higher and lower-proof alcohol by less burdensome measures such as labellmg,
rather than applying different tax rates. ^' In so doing, the European Court applied the "rule
of reason" test under which it weighed the contending goals of the measures against its
impact on trade.^' Thus, the European Court adopted a balancing approach between the
environmental concerns and the trade interests. In order to satisfy the rule of reason
analysis, the Court looks not only into the motives of the measure but also into the effects
of the measure.
The Cassis ruling stands for several propositions. First, the Court of Justice has
allowed two sets of bases under which member States may safeguard environment: the
^° Mat 662-63.
"M at 664.
" Kenneth M. Lord, Note, Bootstrapping An Environmental Policy From An Economic Covenant:
The Teleological Approach ofthe European Court ofJustice, 29 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 571, 581 (1996).
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Article 36 and the Cassis doctrine. Second, the Cassis doctrine created an open ended Hst
of "mandatory requirements" which could limit the application of free movement of goods;
thus reflecting that free movement of goods is not an overriding concern/^ Even under
Cassis however, the "mandatory requirements" did not explicitly mention environmental
protection, although its implication became evident.^'' Though some commentators^^ mention
Waste Oils case as including environment into the mandatory requirements, it was the
Danish Bottles^^ case which confirmed the protection of environment as part of the
mandatory requirements. Moreover, even though the environment may now be protected
by national measures either under Article 36 or the rule of reason, after an analysis of the
case-law, one commentator concludes that Article 36 and the rule of reason has been merged
in its application.^' Furthermore, the European Court applies the condition laid down in the
" See Belgian Wastes case. Case 2/90, Commission v. Belgium, ECJ, July 9, 1992 (unpublished
opinion) as cited in Geradin, supra note 15, at 185, n. 227.
" Geradin, supra note 15, at 180, citing the "communication from the Commission concerning the
consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (Cassis de
Dijon) 1980 O.J. (C256)2." Id. at note 202.
" Geradin, supra note 15, at 181. Another commentator is of the view that the rule of reason was
formulated in the Dassonville case. See STEPHEN Weatherhill & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW: THE ESSENTIAL
Guide to the Legal Workings of the European Community 502 (new ed., 1995). The authors suggest
that the rule of reason is a 'fijsion' of the Dassonville and Cassis cases. Id.
^^ Case 302/86, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607 [hereinafter Danish Bottles
case].
" ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 69.
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second sentence to Article 36 as part of rule of reason analysis/* Thus, it is clear that a
challenged measure may not be discriminatory^^ or constitute disguised discrimination.
4. The Rule of Reason Conditions
In the view of Verloren Van Themaat, a noted authority on the Community law. the rule
ofreason describes a "general principle of interpretation in relation to strict interpretation laid
down by provisions of the [European Union] Treaty. ""*° As shown above, the rule of reason
applies the second sentence of Article 36 which states that a measure should not "constitute
a means of arbitrar>' discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade."""
It is evident from an analysis of the case-law that the European Court has formulated
four conditions under the rule of reason. First, the policy objectives must fall in an area
where the Community legislation is scarce. Second, the measure at issue must genuinely
pursue the stated goals of Article 36 or be covered by the mandatory requirements. Third, the
measure must not arbitrarily discriminate or be a disguised one. Fourth, a "relationship"
'' Id at 72.
^^ See e.g.. Case 4/75, Rewe Zentralfinanz GmbH v. LandwirtschaftsKammer, 1975 E.C.R. 843,
[hereinafter the REWE case] in which the European Court states that differences in treatment between imported
and domestic products could be viewed as discriminatory unless there is reason to believe to the contrary. Id
See also BURROWS, FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 60 (1987), where Burrows points out
that the European Court has applied only one condition of the second sentence of article 36, namely, arbitrary
discrimination and has left out "disguised discrimination". But see ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 73, where
Ziegler points out, referring to subsequent case-law that the second sentence is applied to the rule of reason
test. Id.
^° See Weatherhill & BEAUMONT, supra note 35 at 510, n. 41, citing Verloren Van Themaat's
opinion (who on analogies with the US law opined that the rule of reason describes a "general principle of
interpretation in relation to strict prohibitions laid down by provisions of the EEC Treaty") in Case 286/81,
Oosthoek Uitgeversmaatschappij Bv., [1982] E.C.R. 4575.
"' Article 36, EUROPEAN UNION TREATY.
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should exist between the stated objective and the measure at issue. To determine whether
a relationship exists or not. the European Court typically examines the following factors:
(a) whether the measure is capable of attaining the indicated objective,
(b) whether the measure chosen is the least trade-restrictive measure leading to the
desired level of protection, and
(c) whether the restrictive character of the measure is proportionate, that is, not excessive
in relation to the improvement in environmental quality.^
The first and second conditions are particular to the context of the European Union; the
third and fourth conditions are relevant for this analysis. It must be pointed out however that
other than specifying the conditions broadly, the European Court like the GATT Panels have
also had difficulty in articulating the specific elements that would fall under the salient
conditions.
a. Arbitrary Discrimination
What precisely constitutes 'arbitrary discrimination' is elusive. In legal parlance,
'discrimination' connotes unequal treatment of equals.^"' If so, it might seem that the term
'arbitrary' is superfluous.'*'* However, case-law suggests that this is not ^b. In Italy v.
Commission, the European Court articulated that:
'*^ ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 73.
*' The word "discriminate" is defined as "to make a difference in treatment on a basis other than
individual merit." See THE Merrjam WEBSTER Dictionary (new ed., 1994).
" Oliver, supra note 20, at 1 82. Oliver believes that the use of the word "arbitrary " is "no doubt
due to the fact that the term "arbitrary discrimination" appear in Article XX of GATT on which Article 36 is
modelled." Id.
*^ See e.g., BURROWS, supra note 39, at 63. Burrows believes that the term "arbitrary" is not without
significance. Id.
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The different treatment of non-comparable situations does not lead automatically to
the conclusion that there is discrimination. An appearance of discrimination in form may
therefore in fact correspond to an absence of discrimination in substance. Discrimination
in substance would consist in treating either similar situations differently or different
situations identically."*^
Under this rule it becomes important then to determine whether there is "similarity" of
situations. This comparison of how the domestic goods are treated as opposed to imported
goods has helped the European Court to determine the presence of arbitrary discrimination.
State promotion to purchase domestic goods as opposed to foreign goods is an arbitrary
discrimination. The Buy Irish^^ case is a good example. Similarly, restrictions that fall
heavily on imported products than on domestically produced good would constitute arbitrary
discrimination.'*^ A lack of domestic restrictions would constitute discrimination; however,
it is the lack of proper justification that makes a measure constitute "arbitrary
discrimination." This was demonstrated in the Rewe-Zentralfinanz v.
LandwirtschaftsKammer'*^ where even though were no corresponding phytosanitary controls
on domestically produced apples that were required for imported apples, the European Court
held that:
The different treatment of imported and domestic products, based on the need to prevent
the spread of the harmful organism could not, however, be regarded as arbitrary
'"Case 13/63, Italy v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 165.
'' Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland, [1982] E.C.R. 4005.
"^e Commission v. France, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 743, para. 7.33 ( where advertising restrictions were
imposed on imported alcoholic drinks on grounds of public health. Even though some domestic industries
were caught by the restrictions, the European Court held that it was arbitrary discrimination).
'"Case4/75, [1975] E.C.R. 843.
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discrimination if effective measures are taken in order to prevent the distribution of
contaminated domestic products and if there is reason to beUeve, in particular on the
basis of previous experience, that there is a risk of the harmful organism's spreading if
no inspection is held on importation.^*^
This equality of treatment was reiterated by the European Court in the Conegate^^ case in
which it held that a total ban of "dolls" on public morality grounds must be matched by a ban
on the domestic 'manufacture or marketing of the same goods" within the regulating State.^"
b. Disguised Restriction
This test is to examine whether the measure at issue is protectionist in nature. In
order to do so, the European Court will not take the measure at its face value but will look
behind the measure.^" The underlying rationale for this test is to detect whether there are
motives other than those supplied by the regulating party. '''* Typically, the Court looks to see
if there are any "non-economic" reasons.^^
An obvious form of disguised restriction was seen in Commission v. United
Kingdom,^^'m which United Kingdom banned the import of poultrymeat alleging public
^' Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1986] E.C.R. 1007, para.
16 [hereinafter Conegate case].
'-Id
" ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 90.
^^ See Hession & Macrory, supra note 17, at 199. But see Oliver, supra note 20, at 184, where
Oliver states that "it has been suggested that Article 36 would have much the same meaning even without this
expression [disguised restriction]." /(^(footnotes omitted).
" Case 95/81, Commission v. Italy, [1982] E.C.R. 2187, 2204.
'* Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793.
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health and animal health reasons to prevent the spread ofNewcastle disease. The European
Court rejected this claim because it found that the measure was motivated by reasons other
than those supplied.^^ The European Court went further to state that "since the import ban
constituted a disguised restriction on trade between Member States, the presumption that it
was not justified under Article 36 was increased."^^
c. The Principle of Proportionality
In general terms, the Proportionality rule states that the trade-restrictiveness of an
environmental measure must be directly proportional to the level of protection needed for the
protection of the targeted entity. Typically, two factors must be known for this rule to apply.
First, a "target" that needs protection must be identified. In this regard, there is very little
discretion for the Member States as it is confined to the policy objectives stated in Article
36 or the rule of reason. Second, the level of protection needed to retain, regain or conserve
the "target". Since the dangers to the environmental target and consequently the level of
protection needed to conserve the target varies from case to case, the European Court has
approached this issue on a case-by-case basis. As such, the European Court has not evolved
a clear set of rules and the assessment of the degree of protection determine the level of trade
" The European Court found "that for some months prior to the introduction of the ban the United
Kingdom Government had been subject to pressure from domestic poultry producers to block imports. This
was well documented in the British press. Secondly, the ban was announced on August 27, 1981 and came
into effect on September 1 , 1 98 1 . It was thus introduced so hastily that the Commission and the Member States
were neither consulted nor even informed in good time. This timing also had the effect of excluding french
Christmas turkeys from the British market for the 1981 season. Thirdly, when France sought to comply with
the new British requirement, the United Kingdom refused to take cognisance of it, adding a further requirement
which France did not meet." Oliver, supra note 20, at 184. Cases such as these are rare. In reality however,
the disguised restriction is more subtle and hard to determine.
'* Oliver
,
supra note 20, at 1 85.
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restriction that may be allowed. However an analysis reveals that the European Court has
consistently applied the following guidelines:
(a) whether the measure is genuinely aimed at or reasonably justified for the attempted
objective (suitability or reasonableness of a measure).
(b) whether the measure is essential or necessary for the attainment of the objective,
implying that it has to be the least trade-restrictive measure available among several
alternatives (least trade restrictive measure), and
(c) whether the improvement in environmental quality is proportionate to the restriction
of trade resulting from this measure. This third aspect requires a sound relationship
between the restrictive character of a measure and its result (proportionality or
prohibition of excessiveness).^^
The Danish Bottles case,'''^ is a classic illustration where the European Court applied
the Principle of Proportionality. In this case, the Danish Government introduced a system
under which the manufacturers of beer and soft drinks had to market their beverages in
reusable containers. Also, such reusable containers had to be approved by the Danish
environmental authorities. However, following protests from other Member States and the
Commission that the rule is burdensome for foreign exporters, the Danish Government
amended the law and established a deposit-and-retum system under which non-approved
containers could be used upto a certain quantity set by the Danish Government.^'
The Commission challenged the Danish measure as inconsistent with Article 30 of
the Treaty and claimed that the Danish Government's object of protecting the environment
could be achieved by less trade restrictive means. The Commission alleged that the deposit
and return system with limits amounted to a quantitative restriction. The Danish
'' ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 97-8 (footnotes omitted).
^ Danish Bottles case, supra note 36.
"" Id.
63
Government contended that its measure constitutes a "mandatory requirement" for the
protection of the environment. With regard to the compulsory deposit-and-retum system, the
European Court recognized that the recycHng of containers furthered the aims of the
measure. Though the deposit and return system imposes a burden on the free movement of
goods among member States, the European Court found that the measure was not
"disproportionate" to the goal sought to be achieved. Nevertheless, the European Court
reasoned that the restriction on quantity could not be tolerated since it hinders free movement
ofthe good and the adverse trade effects outweigh the benefits the measure seeks to achieve.
The European Court found that the adverse trade impacts created by the measure was
disproportionate to the objective pursued."" Such measures are not "necessar} " measures.
Further, in several other cases, the European Court has held Proportionality Principle
to mean and include 'necessity' which requires the European Court look into the extent of
the burden the challenged measure imposes on trade.^^ Thus, in the German Meat
Preparation Case,^"* Germany adopted a regulation whereby it prohibited the sale of meat
products from meat which had not been processed in the country the meat was produced.
Rejecting Germany's "public health" arguments, the European Court found that though
Germany did not prevent meat imports from other countries, the "processing requirement"
was considered burdensome and disproportionate to the purported objective of the measure.^^
Moreover, 'necessity' requires that there be a "casual connection" between the measure
" Id. at 4632.
" ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 182.
" Case 153/78, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1979 E.C.R. 2555 (1979).
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imposed and the objective souglit. Likewise, in the Gilli case,^^ the European Court rejected
the Itahan ban on the sale of non-wine vinegar unjustifiable, since the Court did not see the
nexus "justifying any restriction on the importation of the product [non-wine vinegar] in
question from the point ofview either of the protection of public health or of the fairness of
commercial transactions or the defense of the consumer."^''
Furthermore, the European Court has pointed out in some cases that, where adequate
alternatives are available, measures whose effects on trade are minimal should be used to
attain the objective.^^ This emphasis on the "least restrictive altemative(s)" was made in the
Waste Oils^^ case. In Waste Oils, the European Court reiterated that free movement ofgoods,
freedom of competition, and freedom of trade make up the elemental principles of the
Community law7° Simultaneously however, the European Court hastened to add that
freedom of trade is not superior than other concerns and consequently, trade concerns do not
require absolute treatment over other concerns. Rather, it must be seen in the "perspective
of environmental protection, which is one of the Community's essential objectives."^'
Essential as environmental protection is, if less restrictive alternatives exist, a Member State
is required to adopt such a measure. This principle derived further strength in the Belgian
*" Case 788/79, Criminal proceedings against Gilli and Andres, 1980 E.C.R. 2071 (1980).
" Id. at 2078.
** Geradin, supra note 1 5, at 181.
^' Case 240/83, Procureru de la Republique v. Association de Defense des Bruleurs d'huiles Usagees,
1984 E.C.R. 531 (1984).
™ Id. at 548.
' Id. at 549.
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Butter case,^" where the measure which required imported margarine be sold in a cube-
shaped blocks to differentiate between butter and margarine on health grounds was rejected
as other effective measures such as labelling were available/^
C. The Balancing Approach of the United States
1. The Dormant Clause Power
The principle of unhindered movement of the goods across the several States in the
United States is implicitly stated in the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
It states that "[t]he Congress shall have power ... to regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States."^"* However, since the Commerce clause "does not say what the states may
or may not do in the absence of congressional action,"'^ the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the Commerce Clause to include an affirmative grant of authority to the
Congress to integrate the markets across the several States and, at the same time, a negative
prohibition on the States' power to place unjustifiable burdens on interstate commerce.'^
Further, in the context of trade and environment conflict, it is important to notice the absence
of explicit reference to environmental protection in the United States Constitution. Given this
absence, the "green" power first belong to the several States. Even as the States' exercised
'- Case 261/81, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PvbA, 1982 E.C.R. 613
(1982)[hereinafter Belgian butter case]. See also Case 104/75, Adriaan de Peijper, Managing Director of
Centrafarm BV, 1976 E.C.R. 613 (1976)(challenging a Danish regulation which required importers of
pharmaceutical products to obtain clearance documents from its national health authorities).
^' Belgian butter case, supra note 72.
'' U.S. Const., Art. 1, s. 8, cl. 3.
" H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
'^ See e.g. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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their power to protect the environment, they must do so without affecting unduly the free
flow of commerce. The Supreme Court realized that a balance must be struck in order to
ensure the benefits of free flow of commerce and high environmental quality. An analysis
of the case-law shows that the Supreme Court has favored a balancing approach that required
a distinction between "outright protectionism" and the "indirect burdens on the flow of
trade.""
Measures that hinder trade across the States may be either facially discriminatory or
facially neutral measures. In contrast, subtle but definite burdens on trade may be caused by
non-discriminatory measures also. To be sure, the Supreme Court has created different tests
for each of these categories. In order to determine the test to be applied, typically, the Court
uses a two-step analysis.^* The first step involves a determination of the degree of
discrimination. The degree of discrimination determines the test to be applied.
Discriminatory measures receive a strict scrutiny, whereas non-discriminatory measures
receive a less strict balancing approach between the burdens and the benefits of the measure.
2. The Dean Milk Test
As early as in 1950, the Supreme Court of the United States answered what happens
when a measure is facially neutral in the Dean Milk Co. v. City ofMadison. ^'^ In Dean Milk,
the city of Wisconsin erected a 'five-mile milk' ordinance under which milk which was
pasteurized beyond five miles radius of the city was prohibited from sale, allegedly to protect
" City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
^^ Erin A. Walter, Note, The Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Call Desperate
Measures: Looking to the European Unionfor a Lesson in Environmental Protection, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1161, 1176(1996).
'^40 U.S. 349,354(1951).
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the quality of milk and thus the health and well-being of the local community. The Court
noted that the ordinance at issue was facially neutral, as it applied to all milk producers
outside the five mile limit equally. ^° That sanitary regulation was a legitimate local concern
was readily conceded.*' Nevertheless, the Court held that the City of Madison's measure is
a plain discrimination against interstate commerce.*" It held that even ''unquestioned power
to protect the health and safety of its people" cannot justify discriminatory measures, if
reasonably non-discriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests
are available."*^ The Court found that non-discriminatory alternatives such as inspection
and certification system were available.*^ Similarly, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission,^^ the Court held that a facially neutral measure would survive
judicial scrutiny only if it furthers a legitimate state goal and there are no reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives. Placing the burden on the regulating state, the Court in Hunt
added:
When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated,
the burden falls on the state to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing
*°/^. at353.
''Id.
'- Id at 354.
''Id
''*
Id. at 354-56. In order to determine the adequacy of alternatives, the court took note of the
testimonies and recommendations. Id. This was not sufficient for the dissent. The dissent argued that the
record was not sufficient to determine the adequacy of the solutions. Moreover, the courts cannot 'second-
guess' the adequacy of alternatives. Id. at 359-60 (Black J. dissenting, Douglas & Minton JJ., concurred,
dissenting).
'M32 U.S. 333(1977).
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from the statute and the unavailabihty of non-discriminatory ahematives adequate
to preserve the local interests at stake.
^^
3. The P/Ae Test: A Further Refinement
When faced with measures that have legitimate local interests, the Court has applied
a lower standard of scrutiny set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.^^ Under Pike, the Court
deliberately balances the legitimate local interests against its incidental effect on trade. The
measure will pass scrutiny unless the burden on trade is clearly in excess of the local
interests. In its words, the Court in Pike held that:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effect on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. ... If a legitimate local interest is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interests involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
lesser impact on interstate activities.**
Further, for the Pike test to apply, a statute must be evenhanded. When there is no
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state commerce, the measure is viewed as
evenhanded. Even in evenhanded measures, the Court recognizes however that some
incidental effects on trade could occur. Considering the local benefits the measure would
bring, the minimal trade impacts could be ignored. If impact on trade is excessive, the
measure will be struck down. In Minnesota v. Clover LeafCreamery Co.,^'^ the Supreme
'* Id at 353 (citations omitted).
"397 U.S. 137(1970).
^* Mat 142.
449 U.S. 456(1981).
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Court applied the Pike test to uphold a Minnesota law that banned plastic non-returnable
containers on the grounds of environment protection. Note must be made that the Court
favored the Minnesota legislation even though the measure had burdensome effects on trade,
such as paralyzing out-of-state industry and protecting local industry. ^'^ In other words, the
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that it would lean toward legitimate local interests if the
burdens on trade are not excessive.
4. The Per Se Standard
With regard to discriminatory measures, the Court has applied a stricter level of
scrutiny. Philadelphia v. New Jersey^^ tested the validity of a New Jersey statute which
prohibited the import of waste into the state from outside.^' Pointing out that whatever the
ultimate aim of the measure at issue, the principle of non-discrimination must be not
violated,^^ the Court reiterated that there are two standards that may be applicable in the
context. One is the "per se" rule which condemns measures that are simply protectionist in
nature; those measures "overtly block[] the flow of interstate commerce. "'* On the other
hand, if a measure advances a local interest in a non-discriminatory way, the Pike test would
apply. ^^ To apply the right test then, it is critical to determine whether the measure is
^" Id. See also American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n., 517 P. 2d. 691 (Ore. App.
1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
''437 U.S. 617(1978).
'-Mat 618.
'^ Id. at 627.
'" Id at 624. See also Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
^' Id at 624.
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protectionist. The Court held that though a "purpose" analysis would be helpful to determine
whether the measure is protectionist or not, it is not dispositive because the "evil of
protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."''^
Furthermore, the Court noted that New Jersey had not offered any explanation to
show why it violated the principle of non-discrimination^' by treating out-of-state waste
differently from the in-state waste. Consequently, the Court concluded that the New Jersey
statute was a protectionist measure. Further, the Court emphasized that adequate alternatives
were available such as restricting the flow of waste into landfills, even though incidental
trade distortions may occur.^^ Thus, not only should the end be justifiable, but also the
means by which a goal is achieved should be justifiable.
Whenever the Supreme court saw "economic protectionism" in the guise of
environmental measures, it has not hesitated to apply the Philadelphia test. In Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill Inc., v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,^^ for example,
Michigan's Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) provided that solid waste generated in
a county must be disposed within that county. Waste from another county. State or country
was banned. A statute as clearly discriminatory against trade as this one would be controlled
by Philadelphia law. Indeed, the Court applied the 'per se' rule and held that the Michigan
statute constitutes "economic protectionism." In order to avoid such a conclusion however,
the Supreme Court indicated that Michigan should demonstrate a valid reason other than
'' Id. at 626-27.
'' Id at 626.
'M12 S.Ct. 2019 (1992).
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economic reasons. Michigan failed. Rather, Michigan attempted to persuade the Court that
Dean Milk test should apply. Rejecting this line of argument, the Court ruled that in a facially
discriminatory measure, the burden of proof that the same goal cannot be adequately
achieved by non-discriminatory alternatives must be met. Michigan failed this test. Further,
the related Maine v. Taylor^°° requires that the regulating state offer justification for out-of
state discrimination. Michigan failed this test too.
Similarly, in Chemical Waste Management Inc. V. Hunt^^^ the Court applied the
Philadelphia law and struck down the tax applied on out-of-state waste imports. The
respondent tried to justify the fee on environmental grounds. However, the court rejected the
argument on the ground of availability of the "non-discriminatory alternatives."
That the per se standard of Philadelphia is limited in application and, that even a
discriminatory measure does not automatically attract Philadelphia law is evident from the
Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma}^- In Hughes, the validity of an Oklahoma
export ban shipments of minnows from Oklahoma waters was questioned. Arguably, the
application of the Philadelphia law would have been justified. Further, the Court conceded
that the statute discriminates on its face, the Court held that "at a minimum such facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and
of absence of non-discriminatory alternatives. "'°^ Though the Court noticed that "non-
discriminatory alternatives" could have been adopted, the Court in Hughes nevertheless
'°° 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
'°' 112 S.Ct. 2009(1992).
'°M41 U.S. 322(1979).
'°^ Id. at 377.
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rejected the strict Philadelphia test and instead applied the more balanced Dean Milk test.
The Court buih on the Hughes' analysis in Maine v. Taylor, '""^ and other cases as well.'°'
D. Should the WTO Adopt the Rule of Reason: An Analysis
It is not intended to make a comparison between the two systems; '°^ rather, the
examination reveals that both the systems have developed a jurisprudence that reflects their
ability to foster integration of trade and the environment by legal principles. However, this
is not to say that the principles developed by them do not have problems. '°^ To be sure, both
the regimes have not been able to give us a clear set of criteria other than relying on guiding
phrases such as "arbitrary discrimination" and "disguised restriction" or "evenhandedness."
While they bite the easy ones, they seem to have trouble when it comes to testing measures
that fall within uneasy borders.
Nevertheless, both the courts by their ingenious interpretation of the legal provisions
have in effect supplemented the vigor that was perceived lacking in the legislative arena for
adequate protection of the environment. As demonstrated above, the rule of reason
'°M77U.S. 131 (1986).
'°^ See eg.,New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
'°^ee Geradin, supra note 15, for a comparative analysis of the approaches taken by the European
Union and the United States. See also Walter, supra note 78 (the comparison is primarily focused on the waste
cases).
'°'' For a criticism of the Pike analysis, see e.g., Vincent Blasi III, supra note 13, at 186. Blasi points
out that the Pike analysis has several limitations. First, the Pike standard employs only a "contingent balancing
test: before any balancing is to be undertaken, the state regulation must pass a three-pronged threshold scrutiny
and be judged (1) 'even-handed', (2) designed to effectuate a legitimate local public interest' and (3) 'only
incidental' in its effects on interstate commerce." Second, the test "does not specify what is to happen if a
regulation fails to pass the three-pronged threshold scrutiny." Third, "the Pike standard does not specify exactly
how 'the extent of the burden' on commerce is to be assessed." Id. For a criticism on adapting the approaches
of the European Court and the United States Supreme Court to the GATT, see Chamovitz, supra note 14,
at 481-486.
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approach taken by the European Court of Justice and the Pike analysis taken by United
States Supreme Court in order to bring equiHbrium between trade and the environment
issues are very similar. '°^ The dominant method of analysis by both the courts is to strike a
balance between the two competing goals.'""* Such an approach has facilitated the process
of integrating trade and the environment.
The United States has more power granted to it under the Commerce Clause. The
Supreme Court has ingeniously used the "silence" of the Constitution to advance the free
flow of commerce. Unlike protection of the environment, the free flow of interstate
commerce is a constitutionally mandated goal. Even though the Supreme Court advanced
this goal vigorously, it realized that this pursuit is not an end in itself. The balancing
approach found in Pike exemplifies this concern.
On the other hand, the European Union was cut from a different cloth. Not to mention
that, unlike the United States which is two centuries old, the European Union is of recent
origin. "° Much like the GATT/WTO, the growth of environmental law regime has been
slow. The European Union Treaty provisions lacked the legislative commitment and strength
that was needed to support an environmental regime. Realizing that the harmonization of
environmental laws at the Community level is rather inadequate, the European Court of
'°* ZlEGLER, supra note 26, at 75.
'°^ Geradin, supra note 15, at 1 9 1
.
"° The European Community (now European Union) was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1958.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5.
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Justice has been creative.'" The theory of mandatory requirements or the rule of reason
doctrine exempHfies this approach.
For the purpose of analysis, the European Union Treaty is more closer to the GATT.
The wordings of Article 36 of the European Union Treaty and Article XX of the GATT are
similar. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the European Court had to grapple with
interpretations of key phrases that define the scope of the provision's application.
Consequently, the jurisprudence of the European Court was examined closely. This thesis
argues that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should adopt a rule of reason approach.
E. Structure of the Suggested Rule of Reason
From the above analysis, an attempt is made in this section to develop a rule of
reason that the WTO Body may utilize to reconcile trade and environment disputes. The
doctrine primarily contains three tests: (1) The Proportionality Test, (2) The Arbitrary
Discrimination Test and, (3) The Disguised Discrimination Test. It may seem that the rule
of reason adds only the Proportionality test to the already existing other two conditions that
are applied by the GATT/WTO Panels. Nonetheless, as the foregoing analysis show, the
Proportionality principle tempers the other two tests as well by placing equal emphasis to
both trade and environmental concerns. Moreover, it must be remembered that the
suggested elements are not exhaustive. It is left open-ended to let changes take place as the
law takes shape through application by the WTO.
'" See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character ofSupranationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR.
L. 267 (1982) takenfrom Nichols, supra note 14, at 713. "Joseph Weiler, who has long studied the European
Court of Justice, believes that active and independent judicial review is a critical element in making a
supranational body both legitimate and effective." Id.
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1. The Proportionality Test
If there is one principle that cuts across the entire analysis of the European Court, it
is the Principle of Proportionality. The European Court has used this principle to
determine: whether measure is necessary(or justified). Further, the Proportionality Principle
has guided the European Court to examine whether the challenged measure constitutes
arbitrary discrimination or disguised discrimination.
While GATT uses the word "necessary", the European Union Treaty uses the word
"justified"; however the latter has been interpreted to mean "necessary.""- In order to find
out whether a particular measure is "necessary", rather than employ the "least-restrictive
standard," the rule ofreason approach employs the Proportionality principle. This looks into
the level of protection the 'target' requires. The degree of protection determines how
restrictive the challenged measure may be. A very high level of protection for the target
requires stringent trade measures such as a total ban, absent adequate alternatives.
Oftentimes, the degree of protection required is subjective and is best left to the regulating
state with burden of proof on them. Though scientific evidence may be helpful to evaluate
the degree of protection required,"^ its usefulness is circumscribed due to difficulties in
application."'' In some cases, it may not be needed to go into the scientific evidence."^ The
"^ See McDonald, supra note 1 1 , at 434. Both the GATT and the European Union have held the term
"necessary" to mean two things: exhaustion of available remedies and proportionality. Id. at 434.
"^ See Hession & Macrory, supra note 17, at 201
.
""W. at 200.
"^ See Cassis case, supra note 28, which illustrates the European Court's tactfiil avoidance of the use
of scientific evidence to reject Germany's alcohol tolerance inducement claim and instead base its decision on
facts.
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Proportionality principle rightly places emphasis on the environmental target to be protected.
On the other hand, the "least-restrictive measure" standard employed by the GATT Panels
simply places emphasis on the challenged trade restriction and ignores the environmental
target. Further, the least trade restrictive approach requires a scaling of the "restrictiveness"
of the measures. As Esty points out. a lesser restrictive measure is always conceivable and
consequently the test becomes almost insurmountable."^
2. Arbitrary Discrimination
Non-discrimination is a first principle. Its violation is rarely excused. Nevertheless,
in warranted circumstances, discrimination becomes a non-issue."^ The crucial question
then is whether the measure at issue constitutes "arbitrary discrimination." From the above
analysis, it is evident that a measure becomes arbitrary when a "proper justification" is not
provided. Put differently, the absence of a valid justification makes a discrimination
arbitrary}^^ In the case of the European Union, the European Court looks to see if the
measure falls under either the heads of justification under Article 36 or the mandatory
requirements. A national measure becomes hard to justify if Community law exists.
Member States have very little discretion if the Community has harmonized the law. In the
United States, the approach is more or less similar. Federal law pre-empts state power. In
"* Daniel C. Esty, Greening the Gatt: Trade, Environment, and the Future 48 (1994).
"^ See Danish Bottles case, supra note 36; see also Geradin, supra note 1 5, at 1 85. "It is noteworthy
that the [European] Court did not raise the issue of discrimination. The Court focused exclusively on the
principle of proportionality." Id. Geradin however criticizes the reasoning of the European Court and argues
that the European Court should have examined discrimination as an issue. Id.
"* See Oliver, supra note 20, at 1 82.
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the absence of federal legislation, the Court is convinced about the power of States to
regulate their environment."'^
Further, the analysis points out that Courts must look for "similarity" of
circumstances. The European Court has clearly articulated this position in the Italy v.
Commission^ -^ case. Indeed, the language of the chapeau in Article XX clearly captures this
notion when it states that any measure is "subject to the limitation that it does not constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where the same conditions prevail"^'''
It may also be suggested that the term "unjustifiable discrimination" in the chapeau
of Article XX is superfluous. It is seen that the "arbitrary discrimination" test incorporates
ih.Qjustification test. In numerous cases, the GATT Panels have agreed in principle with the
regulating state that the target of protection is a valid justification to take regulatory
measures.'"" However, the measures have failed to satisfy the other conditions.
Furthermore, it is clear that arbitrary discrimination has been given a rather open-
ended definition. Rather than define what 'arbitrary discrimination' means, the European
Court has struck down cases in which it felt that the measures did not disclose proper
justifications. The case-law ofHenn & Darby^^^ and Conegate^''^ are illustrative. Both these
cases were total bans on public morality grounds. However, in Henn & Darby,
"' See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 623.
'^° Supra note 46.
'-' Art. XX, GATT (emphasis added).
'^^ See chapter II, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
'"' Case 34/79, R. v. Henn and Darby, [19791 E.C.R. 3795.
'^'Case 121/85, 5Mpra note 51.
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notwithstanding the fact that there was absolute ban, the European Court concluded that
there was no arbitrary discrimination because the "[European Court] was willing to find that
United Kingdom law did restrain the manufacture and marketing of pornography sufficiently
to enable it to conclude that there was no lawful trade." ''^ In contrast, the European Court in
Conegate "reached the opposite conclusion: the restrictions which existed could not be said
to amount to a prohibition on domestic manufacture or marketing."'"^ The discrimination
seen such as in Conegate could not be justified. The meaning of the term 'arbitrary
discrimination' was further clarified by the European Court in the REWE case.'-^ In REWE,
the fact that the imported products were subject to phytosanitary inspection although
domestic products were not subject to an equivalent examination might be taken to
constitute arbitrary discrimination.'"^ Such a conclusion would be flawed under the European
Court's approach. It reasoned that mere differences in treatment of imported and domestic
products should not mislead the Court. If there is a justifiable need, such as the "need to
prevent the spread of harmful organism" from foreign apples, then the measure could not
be regarded as constituting arbitrary discrimination "if effective measures are taken" '"^
likewise to prevent the harmful organism on the domestic front as well.
'" Craig & De BurCA, supra note 27, at 600.
'~Ud. at 601.
'" Case 4/75, supra note 39.
'-' Id.
'^' Id. See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 1 3 1 ( 1 986)(where the Court upheld the statute that imposed
trade restrictions on the ground that it was necessary to prevent the spread of livebaitfish disease).
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3. Disguised Restriction
Because this test is designed to test if the challenged measure has any protectionist
motives, it is suggested that it might be more appropriately classified as part of the
substantive test. It is not merely to examine and to test the measure in its application.
Rather, it is used to detect wrong or ulterior motives such as a non-economic reasons or
protection of one's domestic industry. Unlike arbitrary discrimination which exposes lack
a valid justification, disguised discrimination exposes a lack of proper motives. This is best
exemplified in the Commission v. United Kingdom, ""^^ where, the real purpose was to protect
domestic production. But it was couched on animal and health grounds. Indeed, this is the
purpose of the disguised restriction test. Notably, the Appellate Body clearly articulated this
aspect in its decision in the United States Gasoline Standards case in which it states that:
It is clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in
international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or
discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of "disguised
restriction."'^'
Not all cases however present a distinct presence of wrong motives as found in the
Commission v. United Kingdom. It is not hard to imagine cases where genuine motives exist,
which might nonetheless become distorted in their application. The measure could have
negative effects of trade. In such cases, the Proportionality principle should guide whether
the incidental effects on trade can be excused. If the impact on trade is clearly excessive
than the putative benefits, then the challenged measure may not be allowed.
™ Case 40/82, supra note 56.
'" Id. at 629.
80
It might be troubling to notice however that even where the measure is undoubtedly
justified, this test has the effect of nullifying the measure as invalid. This might lead to
questionable results. This pitfall might be avoided if in cases where the restriction
constitutes a disguised restriction on trade, "the presumption that [the measure] was not
justified" increases. The disguisedness or the protectionist motives should be viewed "as
evidence that a measure is not justified."'^" This approach gives flexibilit>' to Courts to allow
measures that are valid in themselves, while having some trade distortions subject to
Proportionality.
4. Article XX(g) Analysis
It may be noticed that the above analysis has not touched on Article XX(g) of the
GATT. As demonstrated above, Article XX(b) has a companion in Article 36 of the
European Union Treaty or the mandatory requirements. Article XX(g) does not.
Consequently, the jurisprudence relating to terms found in Article XX(g) form a separate
analysis. Chapter II above examined how the GATT Panels and the WTO Appellate Body
have interpreted Article XX(g). It is clear that the chapeau applies to Article XX(g). To be
sure, the above analysis applies to the application of the Chapeau terms "arbitrary
discrimination" and "disguised restriction."
With regard to the interpretation of Article XX(g), the interpretation given to it by the
Appellate Body in the United States Gasoline Standards case is correct. This decision
rejected the line of reasoning followed by the previous GATT Panels. Importantly, the
Appellate Body's view relaxes the standard of review under Article XX(g) for genuine
'" See Oliver, supra note 20, at 185. [italics in original](01iver cites Commission v. France {^'Italian
Wine') [1980] E.C.R. 2299, as an authority for this proposition).
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conservation goals. The view of the Appellate Body should be re-affirmed in future
disputes to give it the value and credibility it deserves.
CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES' SHRIMP BAN: AN ANALYSIS
A. Introduction and Background
The reader will recall that it was proposed to take the opportunity to examine the rule
of reason approach on a current problem. The problem chosen to apply the rule of reason
is the United States' ban on importation of shrimp and shrimp products harvested in a
manner causing high mortality to the endangered species of marine sea turtles. As the facts
would show, the tuna-ban and the shrimp ban are identical. Thus, it gives us an excellent
opportunity to try the rule of reason and make a comparison of the analysis and outcome
under the rule of reason with that of the existing WTO analysis. The facts of the shrimp ban
as it unfolded is outlined below.
On May 1, 1996, the United States imposed a ban on the importation of shrimp and
shrimp products caught by methods that could adversely affect the endangered species of
sea turtles. The ban was implemented pursuant to the orders of the United States Court of
International Trade (CIT)' and, was based on the United States' Endangered Species Acf
(ESA), as amended in 1989. Section 609 of the amended ESA ("Turtle law") prohibits
importation of shrimp or products from shrimp which have been harvested with commercial
fishing technology that affect adversely certain species of sea turtles. Further, the Turtle
' Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (1995).
M6U.S.C. §1531 etseq.
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law requires certification with documentar>' evidence that the "incidental taking" of sea
turtles is comparable to that of the United States: and that the "fishing environment" does not
pose a threat to sea turtles/
Beginning January 1, 1993, all the commercial shrimp trawl vessels in the United
States fishing in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean from North
Carolina to Texas were required to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) at all times in all
areas/ Since the United States' shrimp fishermen had to use TEDs in the above geographical
area, it was determined that the efforts for conservation of sea-turtles would be undermined
if similar efforts were not made as well by foreign fishermen fishing in those areas.
Accordingly, the geographical scope requiring foreign fishermen to use TEDs was limited."
^ Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989). In pertinent part, the statute reads:
Sec. 609. (a) . .
.
(b)(1) IN GENERAL. ~ The importation ofshrimp or products from shrimp which have been
harvested with commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely such species of sea
turtles shall be prohibited not later than May 1, 1991, except as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE.- The ban on importation of shrimp or products from shrimp
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not apply if the President shall determine and certify to the Congress
not later than May 1 , 1 99 1 , and annually thereafter that —
(A) the government of the harvesting nation has provided documentary evidence of the adoption of
a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of such
harvesting that is comparable to that of the United States; and
(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by the vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable to
the average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles by United States vessels in the course of such
harvesting; or
(C) the particular fishing environment of the harvesting nation does not pose a threat of the incidental
taking of such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting. Id.
" 913 F. Supp. 559, 573 (1995), citing Revised Guidelines for determining comparability of foreign
programs for the protection of turtles in shrimp trawl fishing operations, 58 Fed. Reg.90\S (Feb. 18, 1993).
* 913 F. Supp., at 574. "In passing section 609, Congress recognized that these conservation measures
taken by U.S. shrimp fishermen would be of limited effectiveness unless a similar level of protection is
afforded throughout the turtles' migratory range across the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean and western Atlantic
Ocean." Id.
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On challenge, the United States CIT held that the Turtle law does not contain any
geographical limitations and directed the United States to apply the Turtle law against all
nations that caught shrimp in a turtle unfriendly manner regardless of geographical
limitations.^ Subsequently, the United States sought a modification of deadline for one year,
which was refused/ The United States Department of State had determined that 36
countries have met the requirements of the Turtle law; shrimp imports from all other
countries were banned.^ Under the revised guidelines, the United States had "determined that
import prohibitions imposed pursuant to section 609 do not apply to shrimp or products of
shrimp harvested in a turtle friendly manner."'^ As such, the United States applied the Turtle
law on a shipment-by-shipment basis with an exporter's declaration that the Turtle law was
complied with. The declaration was required to accompany the shipment throughout the
export process. This procedure of allowing shrimp caught using TEDs and banning shrimp
caught without TEDs was challenged before the United States CIT as "dangerous" and
"disingenuous." The CIT rejected the United States' claims and held that the shrimp ban
applies against the harvesting nation. '° Accordingly, the United States banned import of all
shrimp and shrimp products from nations that do not show proof that it has adopted a sea-
turtle conservation program similar to the United States. Now, in order to gain access to the
'913 F. Supp. at574.
^ Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Apr. 10, 1996).
* Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597 (Oct. 8, 1996).
' Id. at 600.
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United States market, shrimp exporting countries must require their shrimp industry to use
TEDs at all times.
Shrimp is the most valuable fishery and the most popular seafood item in the United
States market. According to a 1993 estimate, about 600 million pounds of shrimp were
imported into the United States valued at roughly $2.17 billion. Moreover, shrimp imports
account for approximately 80% of domestic consumption with only 20% of domestically
produced shrimp." Out of nearly 120 nations that export shrimp, Thailand, Ecuador, Mexico,
India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Honduras are the leading exporters of shrimp.'"
The member States affected by the United States' ban have predictably filed a
complaint before the WTO. On October 8, 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand
filed a joint complaint. They have alleged violations of articles I, XI and XIII and
nullification and impairment of benefits of the GATT 1994. At its February 25th meeting,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel. Australia, Colombia, the EC
Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Guatemala, Mexico, Japan, Nigeria and Sri Lanka
have reserved their third-party rights in this matter. As on June 25, 1997, the dispute was yet
to be decided.'^ The Panel's ruling is expected early next year.''*
" U.S. Department of Commerce Statistics, \993. as cited \n9\3 F. Supp. 559,570 (1995).
''5ee913F. Supp. at570.
'^5ee Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes, <http;//www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin.html>
(visited 07/08/97). The Overview is upto date as on June 25, 1997.
'" See Turtles: Shrimp dispute tests US aim to protect species, ENVIRN Library, Cumws file, LEXIS
(July 15, 1997) citing Ghana Schoenberger, Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1997.
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B. Should the Turtle Law be Allowed?
The Turtle law is a PPM identical in facts to the tuna-ban. It was seen that the
GATT Panels held the tuna-ban to be illegal under the GATT. Both the bans are based on
a domestic law of the United States and applied in a manner that requires the change of
fishing practices of other countries. Failure to do so results in non-access to the United States
markets. Both are process based bans which are proscribed under the GATT law.
Considering the number of countries that are affected by this law—over one hundred and
sixty nations export shrimp out ofwhich around thirty six nations have standards comparable
to the United States— the United States seeks a world wide change of fishing practices.
Literally, the United States Congress may be said to have legislated for the world.
In defense of the Turtle law, a strong policy justification for the United States is that
the sea-turtles are an endangered species. Unlike dolphins, sea-turtles are listed under the
CITES. '^ That this is worthy of conservation by trade restrictions is of no doubt. Further, the
United States Turtle law strengthens and furthers the policy goals of the CITES.
Consequently, the import ban under the Turtle law should not be viewed as a ban under a
domestic law. However, such a claim may not be persuasive, since the shrimp ban is based
on the ESA, a domestic law of the United States; it is not is based on CITES. If a measure
is pursuant to the CITES, it should follow the policies and procedures prescribed therein.
Similarly, a claim that the application of the Turtle law is not an unilateral action nor that
it has no extrajurisdictional effect may not hold ground, since the measure seeks to reach
world wide in application. Notwithstanding, as sea-turtles are listed under the CITES, and
'^ See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 ; see also Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT:Harmonizing Free
Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 Envtl. L. 397, 450 (1993).
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due to the fact that they are migratory, the United States has jurisdiction to pursue
conservation measures under the "shared environment" argument. The shrimp ban is such
a measure; accordingly it could be justified under Article XX. Nonetheless, as the tuna-ban
Panel pointed out, if the target of conservation is sea-turtles the measure must regulate sea-
turtles and, not shrimp. Further, in the tuna-dolphin dispute, the process ban rested on a
particular "symbiotic relationship" between tuna and dolphins; no such relationship is
observed between shrimp and sea-turtles.
C. The WTO Analysis of the Shrimp Ban
1. The Like Product Issue
The preliminary question to be examined would be whether the foreign shrimp and
the United states shrimp are like products. It is well established that the "likeness" of the
product depends on the products themselves and not on the way it is produced or processed.
In this case, the Turtle law is a PPM ban. There is no difference between foreign shrimp or
a US shrimp as a product. Consequently, they would be considered "like products."
2. Is the Measure Necessary?
As a first step, the Panel would identify the measure that is the subject of the dispute.
Within each of their domestic jurisdictions, all the shrimp harvesting nations must catch
shrimp in a manner comparable to the United States. This requires that all foreign shrimp
producers use TEDs at all times. This is the mandate of the Turtle law. Earlier, the United
States allowed shipments of shrimp or its products if it was accompanied by the exporter's
declaration that the said shipment of shrimp was caught using TEDs. Now, because the
United States CIT expanded the scope of application of the Turtle law, shrimp can be
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exported to the United States only if the harvesting nation has been certified that all of its
shrimp is harvested using TEDs.
In order to justify the ban under Article XX(b) exception, it is important to show that
the measure is a necessary one. This burden lies on the United States. To begin with,
creating a zero trade situation between two member countries is not the least-trade restrictive
method. On the contrary, it is the most trade-restrictive. Further, the WTO panel would look
to see if alternative and inconsistent measures that could be reasonably employed are
available.'^ Indeed, the Turtle law itself provides alternate measures such as negotiation for
the "development of bilateral or multilateral agreements" with other countries.'^ Other
measures such as labelling could also be effectively used. Moreover, the United States must
prove to the satisfaction of the WTO Panel that least restrictive measures were not
reasonably available to it. It could be said that exhaustion of available remedies or atleast
an attempt to pursue the remedies before resorting to the challenged measures would be very
persuasive to the Panel. Finally, under the tuna-ban Panel analysis, the WTO Panel would
likely conclude that a measure whose intended effect is predicated on change in policies of
other countries could not be considered "necessary."'^
^^ See Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M.
839 (June, 1994)[hereinafter Second Tuna Panel].
'' Pub. L. No. 101-162, Section 609 (a)(1) - (5) (1989).
'* See Second Tuna Panel, supra note 1 6.
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3. Article XX(g)
The Panel would readily concede that turtles constitute an exhaustible natural
resource and thus they would fall with the policy of conservation.''' Prior to the Appellate
Body's decision in the United States Gasoline Standards case"°, the question the Panel would
frame was whether the measure held inconsistent under Article III analysis could be
considered as a measure "relating to" the conservation policy. Such an analysis borrows the
legal conclusion under one set of criterion and applies it to find if the measure was in fact
related to the conservation efforts. Under the current analysis, the test would have to examine
whether the measure is related to the objective sought to be achieved—conservation of turtles.
An examination of the provisions of the Turtle law, section 609 of the amended ESA would
reveal that its stated policy is to conserve sea-turtles. It requires shrimp trawls to use TEDs,
the use of which is viewed as an adequate means to conserve sea-turtles. Accordingly, the
Panel would find that the measure—the use ofTEDs— is related to the policy goal.
Further, the Panel would examine to see if the measure has been "made effective in
conjunction with domestic consumption or production." Again, under the tuna-ban analysis,
the test was whether it was "primarily aimed at" conservation. Now, the Appellate Body has
relaxed the test. It held that "made effective" refers to the measures being "operative, as "in
force" or as having come into effect."'' Likewise, "in conjunction with" is to be read as
'''McDonald, ^wpra notelS, at 441. The existence of an international agreement "seemed to be
critical to the [tuna-ban] Panel's determination that there was a need for conservation measures." Id
"° Report of the Appellate Body in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996)[hereinafter the Gasoline Standards case].
' W at 623.
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"together with" or "jointly with"." Under this terminology, the Turtle law would pass the
"made effective" and "in conjunction with" test as well.
4. The Chapeau Analysis
Though the United States measure has satisfied the test under Article XX(g). the
measure must pass the requirements set out in the chapeau of Article XX. In the United
States Gasoline Standards case, the WTO Appellate Body announced that "the kinds of
considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts
to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination", may also be taken into account in determining
the presence of a "disguised restriction" on international trade.""''
Having said that the "purpose" of the chapeau is to detect abuse or misuse of the
exceptions, the Appellate Body analysis suggests that the adequacy of alternatives forms part
of this analysis. Indeed, the burden lies on the United States to prove it did not have any
reasonable alternatives other than a ban against nations and discriminating between domestic
and imported shrimp products. The United States could argue that there is essentially no
discrimination between nations that have regulatory programs comparable to the United
States. The import ban applies only to nations that do not have such conservation policies;
and as such, they would not be countries "where same conditions prevail." However, there
are several other alternatives such as labelling and cooperative agreements, which the
United States could have pursued. Further, the United States could have allowed a shipment
by shipment import of shrimp or its products. Such a regulation is definitely less trade
restrictive than a total ban. Moreover, the United States' Turtle law could be suspect in view
''Id
'' Id at 629.
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of the fact that the domestic shrimp industry is only twenty percent of the United States'
consumption of shrimp. On the one hand, this market power favors the effectiveness of the
conservancy program."^ On the other hand, it could be suspected as protectionist in nature.
It is incumbent on the United States to establish that it is not protectionist of its domestic
industry.
More troubling to the Panel would be the fact that the United States, through its
Turtle law, has legislated for the world. In order to export to the United States, the shrimp
harvesting nations— around one hundred and thirty nations— are required to show proof that
they have sea-turtle conservation programs comparable to the United States, which is to use
TEDs at all times. Such an economic balkanization or isolation is detrimental to free trade
interests. Moreover, it is noteworthy mention here that the United States has not applied the
import ban pursuant to any international environmental agreement. Under the tuna-ban
analysis, this would have been sufficient to reject the measure as GATT/WTO inconsistent.
Thus, the Panel would most likely view that the Turtle law constitutes "unjustifiable
discrimination" and a "disguised discrimination on international trade."
It is seen that even though the Turtle law is justifiable under Article XX(g) of the
general exceptions, it is not justified under the chapeau of Article XX as a whole. In final
analysis. Article XX would not excuse the United States' shrimp ban.
^'' See Steve Chamovitz, Recent Developments: Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751
(1994).
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D. The Rule of Reason Analysis
In this section, a rule of reason analysis of the shrimp ban is made to see if it would
pass the analysis. As demonstrated above, the rule of reason is a less stringent test when
compared to the GATT/WTO analysis.
1. The Proportionality Test
In the foregoing analysis, it was strongly urged that the term "necessary" should be
subject to a rule of reason analysis which applies the Principle of Proportionality.
Accordingly, the Panel would first determine what is the policy goal of the measure. Second.
what is the degree of protection that may be needed for protection of the target. Third, it
would examine if the measure employed is proportional, or disproportionate or excessive.
If there are less restrictive alternatives available, then such a means should be adopted.
Indeed the burden lies on the United States. The Panel would have no hesitation to concede
that the conservation of sea-turtles constitute a valid environmental protection. With regard
to second question, the United States must show that the sea-turtles require the degree of
protection it has sought to implement: a total ban of imports of shrimp and the use of TEDs
at all times. It has been estimated that over one hundred thousand sea-turtles die annually due
to commercial fishing activities.'^ The United States must be required to support such a
^^ It was estimated that annually 124,000 sea-turtles die due to shrimp fishing activities. The Earth
Island Institute estimated that the United States accidentally killed around 1 1,000 sea-turtles without TEDs.
This figure was extrapolated to calculate the average kill of all the other shrimp harvesting nations which came
to 124,000 sea-turtles. Out of these, the major shrimp producers would account for a large share. The United
States law has identified five species of sea-turtles as endangered or threatened. The Earth Island Institute
provided the Court with opinion of scientists to claim that sea-turtles migrate in large areas. See Earth Island
Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 559.
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claim. "^ Indeed, as mentioned above, that sea-turtles are listed in the CITES is a strong
justification. Even though the claim of the United States could be well supported, the Panel
would have problem accepting the world-wide shrimp ban as proportional to the objective
of conservation of the sea turtles. Particularly, shrimp exports constitute both wild and
acquacultured shrimp. By banning all shrimp products regardless whether they were wild
or aquacultured could be viewed as excessive and disproportionate to the policy goals. In
addition, there are other methods such as labelling. Arguably, the United States could have
allowed shrimp imports that were caught using TEDs with a certification from the exporter.
Even though, this causes some burden in that the certificate is required to accompany the
product all stages of import, it could be excused considering the objective.
More importantly, the Panel would have trouble with the issue of PPM. The above
analysis of the case-law clearly indicates that the measure must deal with the products
themselves. Trade restrictions for non-products are frowned upon; and they are restricted
to concerns within the domestic jurisdiction. The rule of reason analysis also finds it
troublesome to allow PPMs and, trade restrictions that go beyond the regulating country's
domestic jurisdiction.
Thus, even under the rule of reason analysis, the measure would be considered
excessive and disproportionate.
^^ On June 17, 1997, a group of scientists called on the WTO not to support the complaint by
Malaysia, India, Thailand, and Pakistan against the United States' shrimp ban in the WTO. A Statement signed
by more than 160 scientists from 24 countries was introduced supporting the US ban. See BNA INT'L TRADE
Reporter, June 25, 1997.
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2. Arbitrary Discrimination
If the United States law had required foreign nations to harvest shrimp with TEDs
with no such corresponding requirement for domestic shrimp producers, such a measure
would constitute arbitrary discrimination. That is not the case. Rather, the Turtle law
discriminates between shrimp caught by shrimp harvesting nations that do not have
programs comparable to the United States and those that do have such programs. Such a
discrimination is not justifiable unless the United States supports its measure with proper
justification. It may be pointed out that there is no justifiable difference between imported
and domestic shrimp as a "product." Consequently, the Panel must conclude that the United
States' Turtle law operates in a manner which constitutes arbitrary discrimination.
Further, the United States has based its measure on a domestic law for non-domestic
concerns. Undoubtedly, it has the right to protect the resources within its domestic
jurisdiction. However, a unilateral regulation requiring foreign governments to enact
regulatory programs comparable to the United States could not be justified. If the United
States had acted pursuant to a multilateral agreement such as the CITES, a valid justification
could be made out. Indeed, by acting unilaterally, the cause of the environment is not fully
advanced. For instance, the problem of commercial extinction of sea-turtles is not unique
to the United States geographical region. Nor is it a concern with geographical limitations.
If the problem is global, then measures that are effective globally should be pursued. As
mentioned above, a CITES listed target could be conserved under rules and procedure
therein. Similarly, a large number of fish species and natural resources are affected as a
result of commercial fishing bycatch. A unilateral policy choice would only cure the
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symptoms rather than the disease. On the other hand, a multilateral action could be more
effective in solving environmental problems."''
3. Disguised Restriction
For any measure to be dismissed as a disguised restriction, the measure at issue must
be protectionist in nature. Reasons other than those supplied by the regulating country must
be found. In the case of the shrimp ban, it would be hard to come to such a conclusion.
First, as demonstrated above, the ban was imposed pursuant to the court orders. Second, the
legislative goal of the Endangered Species Act as amended is clear: protection of sea turtles
from dangers ofcommercial fishing activities. However, the complaining parties could bring
to the attention of the Panel that the United States has a huge market for shrimp. The market
share of imported shrimp well exceed, by nearly sixty percent, the domestic production of
shrimp which is dominated by the U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region shrimp industry."^
As early as in 1985, a Commission had noted the complaint of the U.S. shrimp industry
-' See Laura B. Campbell, Comment on the Paper by Robert Reinstein, in SUSTAINABLE
Development and International Law 233 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995). With the Montreal Protocol as an
illustration, Campbell argues that a multilateral approach is "more effective in solving global environmental
problems." Id. Further, she states that rather than use unilateral trade restrictions, multilateral policy choice
could benefit from a "combination of measures." Id. For instance, the Montreal Protocol uses a combination
of measures such as "those concerning ongoing scientific evaluation of the causes of ozone depletion and the
effectiveness of its environmental standards and control measures, special and differential treatment for
developing countries, industrial rationalization of ozone-depleting chemical production, and financing
technology transfer and technical assistance for developing countries. " Id.
^^ See Report of the Commissioners Paula Stem, Chairwoman,; Susan W. Liebeler, Vice Chairman;
el al., pursuant to a request of Ambassador William E. Brock, the U.S. Trade Representative on Oct. 5, 1984.
The investigation was made "for the purpose of gathering and presenting information on the competitive,
technological, and economic factors affecting the performance of the U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic shrimp
industry", 1985 ITC LEXIS 144, 3 (1985).
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about their injury from shrimp imports."'^ Though the problem of bycatch of shrimp
harvesting is noticed, the Commission failed to recognize the by-catch of marine turtles
as a specific problem. '° Even though the United States could stress the urgency of the
restoration of endangered species of sea-turtles and justify the shrimp ban, the Panel would
likely emphasize the availability of adequate alternatives to reach the same goal and reject
the United States' arguments.
In sum. the Turtle law as applied is likely to be declared as constituting a disguised
restriction on trade by the United States.
-''
Id. "Member of the U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region shrimp industry have expressed concerns
about their competitive position in the U.S. market, largely in terms of competition from shrimp imports. The
principal claims of the U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region shrimp industry are as follows:
1. Shrimp harvesters in the Gulf and South Atlantic region are being injured as a result of imports;
2. Shrimp industries in foreign countries benefit from government assistance, which makes their
products more competitive in the U.S. market; and
3. Access has been restricted to traditionally open foreign shrimping grounds, particularly off the
coast of Mexico, thus limiting U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region harvesters to U.S. waters and increasing
the pressure on shrimping activities." Id. at 5.
'° Id. at 63. The Commission reports that "[t]here is a significant bycatch, or incidental catch,
associated with shrimp harvesting. Most of the bycatch in the Gulf area is composed of ground fish such as
Atlantic Croaker, spot , sand citrate, and sea catfish and is discarded at sea. ... In the South Atlantic area, the
bycatch consists mostly of "trash" fish, but some commercially important species such as whiting, flounder,
croaker, and spot, are captured. Id. at 66.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
It is worth reiterating that global trade and protection of the environment are policy
goals fundamental to the well-being of the society. This thesis maintains that the goals of
free trade and environmental protection can be accommodated and reconciled within the
GATT/WTO framework. However, as the above study has shown us, the tuna-ban
jurisprudence has revealed an overemphasis on trade concerns exposing the need for the
protection of environmental values. Further, the austere legal standards created by the tuna-
ban rulings has done little help to reconcile the two policy goals. Subsequent rulings, in
particular, the Appellate Body's decision in the United States Gasoline Standards case has
changed the scenario for the better from a free trader's perspective, but much is left to be
desired from an environmentalist perspective.
This thesis recommends that the "least-trade restrictive" interpretation of Article XX
of the GATTAVTO should be relaxed. Rather, a rule of reason approach should be adopted
by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. First, this doctrine would give the WTO Panels
sufficient flexibility to lower the threshold and accommodate genuine environmental
measures and free trade. Second, subjecting the challenged trade measure to a rule of
reason analysis would also discourage any economic protectionism or disguised restriction
that may seek shelter from global competition. Disguised trade restrictions that wear the
environmental mask should fail. However, environmental measures that do not
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unnecessarily hinder trade should be allowed. The rule of reason would facilitate and
enhance the ability of the WTO to balance the two goals. Furthermore, the rule of reason
would not allow trade restrictions unrelated to the products themselves. As the shrimp ban
analysis illustrates, production or process-based bans would also fail under the rule of
reason doctrine. Also, this thesis maintains that multilateral solutions should be preferred
over unilateral actions. Multilateral environmental instruments which reflect the
commitment to protect certain environmental values would be given more effect under the
rule of reason than under the existing tuna-ban analysis. Measures pursuant to the CITES,
the Montreal Protocol, or the Basel Convention, for example, which are doubtful under the
tuna-ban analysis would be valid under the rule of reason doctrine.
Numerous environmental and trade issues are on the horizon. Lasting solutions must
be found if we are to successfully resolve the trade and environment conflicts. A
comprehensive approach to integrate trade and environmental interests must be made. In
this regard, multilateral forums such as the Committee on Trade and Environment of the
WTO could be effectively used. While proceeding in the right direction, the ongoing
'harmonization' efforts of the Committee on Trade and Environment is rather slow. The
WTO Member States should actively support and pursue the agendas of the Committee on
Trade and Environment. Trade and Environment policymakers should approach the
Committee with an understanding of each other's significance and role in an interdependent
and global community. On its part, the Committee must involve the participation of non-
governmental organizations, environmental groups and non-profit organizations. The
Committee must be more transparent and be accessible to input from the public as well.
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Lastly, the thesis topic posed the question, "are tuna and dolphins the same?" While
the answer is obvious, this author, who was struck by the strange "symbiotic relationship"
that exists between tuna and dolphins, believes that global trade and environment share a
similar symbiotic relationship. It is the author's hope that everyone will approach the subject
with similar view.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Burrows, F. (1987). Free movement in European Community law.
Craig, P. & De Burca, G. (1995). EC law: text, cases, and materials.
D'Amato. A. et al. (eds.) (1996). International environmental anthology.
Emiliou, N. & O'Keeffe D. (eds.) (1996). The European Union and world trade law after
the GATT Uruguay round.
Esty, D.C. (1994). Greening the GATT: trade, environment, and the future.
Fox, E. M. & Sullivan, L.A. (1989). Cases and materials on antitrust.
Jackson, J. H. (1 969). World trade and the law ofGA TT.
Jackson, J. H. (1990). Restructuring the GATT system.
Jackson, J. H. et al. (1995). Legal problems of international economic relations.
Jackson, J. H. et al. (3d. ed. 1995). Supplement to legal problems of international
economic relations.
Lang, W. (ed.) (1995). Sustainable development and international law.
Low, P. (ed.) (1992). International trade and the environment.
Merriam Webster dictionary. (New ed. 1994).
100
101
Oliver, P. (1996). Free movement ofgoods in the European Community under articles 30
to 34 ofthe Rome treaty.
Sandalow, T. & Stein, E. (eds.) (Vol. 1, 1982). Courts and free markets:perspectivesfrom
the United States and Europe.
Trade and environment:processes andproduction methods. (OECD Documents, 1994).
Weatherhill, S. & Beaumont, P. (1995). EC law: the essential guide to the legal workings
ofthe European Community.
Zaelke, D. et al. (eds.) (1993). Trade and the environment: law, economics, and policy.
Ziegler, A. R. (1996). Trade and environmental law in the European Community.
CASES
American Can co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n., 517 P. 2d. 691 (Ore. App. 1973).
Case 4/75, Rewe Zentralfmanz GmbH v. LandwirschaftsKammer, 1975 E.C.R. 843.
Case 8/74, Dassonville case, 1974 E.C.R. 837.
Case 34/79, R. v. Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3795.
Case 40/82, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R. 2793.
Case 95/81, Commission v. Italy, 1982 E.C.R. 2793.
Case 104/75, Adriaan de Peijper, Managing Director of Centrafarm BV., 1976 E.C.R. 613.
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Brenntwein, 1979 E.C.R.
649.
Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, 1986 E.C.R. 1007.
Case 153/78, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1979 E.C.R. 2555.
Case 240/83, Procueru de la Republique v. Association de Defense des Bruleurs d'huiles
Usagees, 1984 E.C.R. 531.
102
Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005.
Case 261/81, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PvbA, 1982 E.C.R. 613.
Case 302/86, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark [Danish Bottles], 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
Case 788/79, Criminal Proceedings against Gilli and Andres. 1980 E.C.R. 2071.
Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1913).
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Commission v. France, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 743.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (1995).
Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Apr. 10, 1996).
Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597 (Oct. 8, 1996).
Fort Gatriot Sanitary Landfill Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 1 12 S. Ct.
2019(1992).
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
Hughes V. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Hunt V. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
Pike V. Bruce Chruch Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (191 1).
103
United States v. Topco Associates. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Welton V. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
GATT PANEL DECISIONS
Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales). GATT 1st Supp. BI.S.D. 59 (1953).
Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act . GATT B.I.S.D. 140
(30th Supp. 1984).
Canada- Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon. GATT BI.S.D.
(35th Supp. 1988).
Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages. Adopted on 10 November 1987. GATT B.I.S.D. 34S/83.
Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors. GATT B.I.S.D. 116 (35th Supp. 1989).
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. Appellate Body Report. WTO Doc. AB- 1996-2.
(1996).
Panel Report on "United States Taxes on Automobiles". 33 I.L.M. 1397. (1994).
Report of the Appellate Body in United States ~ Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline. 35 I.L.M. 603. (1996).
Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes. Adopted 7
November 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. 37S/200.
United States - Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada. GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp. 1982).
United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Adopted 7 November 1989,
L/6439, GATT B.I.S.D. 36S/345.
104
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. 30 I.L.M. 1598. (1992)
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. 33 I.L.M. 839. (1994).
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like Products of National Origin).
35 I.L.M. 274. (1996).
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS
Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Reprinted in
Jackson, J.H. et al. (1995). Legal problems ofinternational economic relations. 121.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Apr. 14, 1994. 33 I.L.M. 1145
(1994).
Agreement Establishing the Committee on Trade and Environment. (GATT Ministerial
Decision, Apr. 14, 1994). 33 I.L.M. 1267.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Reprinted in Jackson, J.H. et al. (1995).
Legal problems ofinternational economic relations, 149.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal. 28 I.L.M. 649. (1989).
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
993 U.N.T.S. 243(1987).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT B.I.S.D. 4S/1 . (1969).
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) as amended, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990).
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Adopted June 14, 1992. 31 I.L.M.874
105
Treaty on European Union and Final Act. (Done at Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992).
31 I.L.M. 247(1992).
Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Reprinted in
Jackson, J.H. et al. (1995). Legal problems of international economic relations, 366.
15U.S.C§ 1 (1988).
15 U.S.C. §§2002-2013.
26 U.S.C. §4064.
U.S. Constitution.
United States Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments. Adopted on 2 December, 1970. B.I.S.D.
18S/97.
LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
A Catalogue of Grievances. (Feb. 27, 1993). The Economist.
Anderson, B. (1993). Unilateral trade measures and environmental protection policy. 66
Temp. L. Rev. 75 1
.
Bellas, P. W. (1985). NCAA v. Board of Regents: Supreme Court intercepts per se rule
and rule of reason. 39 (/. Miami L. Rev. 529.
Brooks, G. (1993). Environmental economics and international trade: an adaptive approach.
5 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L Rev. 111.
Caldwell, D.J. (1994). International environmental agreements and the GATT: an analysis
of the potential conflict and the role of a GATT "waiver" resolution. 18 Md. J. Int'l &
Trade 173.
106
Caldwell, D. J. & Wirth, D. A. (1996). Trade and the environment: equilibrium or
imbalance? \1 Mich. J. Int'l L. 563.
Chang, H. F. (1995). An economic analysis of trade measures to protect the global
environment. 83 Geo. L. J. 2131.
Charnovitz, S. (1994). Recent developments:environmental trade sanctions and the
GATT:an analysis of the Pelly amendment on foreign environmental practices. 9 Am.
U. J. Int'l & Pol'y 757.
Charnovitz, S. (1994). Free trade, fair trade, green trade: defogging the debate. 21 Cornell
Int'l L. J. 459.
Charnovitz, S. (1993). A taxonomy of environmental trade measures.
6 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L.Rev. 1.
Charnovitz, S. (1993). The environment vs. trade rules: defogging the debate. 23 Envtl. L.
475.
Dillon Jr., T. J. (1995). The World Trade Organization: a new legal order for world trade?
\6 Mich. J. Int'l L. 349.
Dunhoff, J. L. (1994). Institutional misfits: the GATT, the ICJ & trade-environment
disputes. 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1043.
Environment:under attack:it's humans, not sharks, who are nature's most fearsome predators.
Time p. 59 (Aug. 11, 1997).
Geradin, D. (1993). Free trade and environmental protection in an integrated market: a
survey of the case law of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of
Justice. 2 J. Transnat'l& Pol'y \A\.
107
Haag, C. (1995). Legitimizing "environmental" legislation under the GATT in light of the
CAFE report:more fuel for protectionists? 57 U. Pitt. L Rev. 79.
Hudnall, S. (1996). Towards a greener international trade system:multilateral environmental
agreements and the World Trade Organization. 29 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Prohs. 175.
Hunt, K. J. (1996). International environmental agreements in conflict with GATT—greening
GATT after the Uruguay round agreement. 30 Int'l Law 163.
Jackson, J. H. (1992). World trade rules and environmental policies: interdependent goals
or irreconcilable conflict? 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1221.
Lord, K. M. (1996). Bootstrapping an environmental policy from an economic covenant:
the teleological approach of the European Court of Justice. 29 Cornell Int' I L. J. 571
.
McDonald, J. (1994). Greening the GATT: harmonizing free trade and environmental
protection in the new world order. 23 Envtl. L. 397.
Nichols, P.M. (1996). Trade without values. 90 A^w. U. L. Rev. 658.
Piraino Jr., T. A. (1994). Making sense of the rule of reason: a new standard for section 1
of the Sherman act. 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1753.
Schoenbaum, T. J. (1992). Free international trade and protection of the environment:
irreconcilable conflict? ^6 Am. J. Int'l L. 700.
Schoenbaum, T. J. (1997). International trade and protection of the environment: the
continuing search for reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 268.
Shultz, J. (1995). The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment-toward
environmental reform. 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 423.
Sims, W.J. (1985). NCAA v. Board of Regents and a truncated rule of reason: retaining
flexibility without sacrificing efficiency. 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 193.
108
Snape III, W. J. & Lefkovitz. B.N. (1994). Searching for GATT's environmental miranda:
are "process standards" getting "due process? 27 Cornell Int'l L. J. Ill
.
Stewart, R.B. (1993). Environmental regulation and international competitiveness.
\Q2YaleL J. 201>9.
Walter, E. A. (1996). The Supreme Court goes dormant when desperate times call desperate
measures: looking to the European Union for a lesson in environmental protection.
65 Fordham L. Rev. 1161.
Weiss, E. B. (1992). Environment and trade as partners in sustainable development: a
commentary. ^6 Am. J. Int'l L 728.
Wirth. D. A. (1992). The international trade regime and the municipal law of federal states:
how close a fit? 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1389.
DVW LIBRARY
9GIA
PEB ' 9 ^999
FOR LIBRARY
USE ONLY
